### Hurricanes adv

#### Storms are increasingly frequent and powerful – best scientific evidence

Dvorsky 13 (GEORGE DVORSKY; io9 meteorology; cites numerous scientific studies; 11/08/13; “Welcome to the Age of the Superstorm”; <http://io9.com/welcome-to-the-age-of-the-superstorm-1460773814>; kdub)

Almost exactly one year after Hurricane Sandy hit the U.S. eastern seaboard, the strongest typhoon in recorded history has slammed into the Philippines. That's two superstorms in two years. It's the new normal, folks — and climate change is likely to blame.¶ "Super Typhoon" Haiyan swept through the Philippines last night. Officials haven't been able to make contact with many of the affected areas, so the extent of the damage, or how many people have been injured or killed, is still not clear. But it's looking ugly.¶ What is known, however, is that this is the strongest cyclone of the year — and quite possibly of all time. It's the most powerful tropical typhoon to have ever reached land — and the numbers are absolutely staggering. According to the U.S. Navy's Joint Typhoon Warning Center, Haiyan produced sustained winds of 167 mph (269 km/h) with gusts reaching 201 mph (324 km/h).¶ The previous record belonged to Hurricane Camille of 1969, which made landfall in Mississippi with 190 mph (305 km/h) winds. Sandy, with its massive 1,100 mile (1,800 km) sprawl, sustained winds of 80 mph (130 km/h).¶ In addition to its power, Haiyan was remarkable in that the walls of the storm that rotate around the eye were not replaced as it moved. This typically occurs in typhoons, which has the affect of weakening wind speed.¶ As for the link to climate change, experts theorize that a plentiful supply of typhoon-fueling warm ocean waters, low atmospheric wind shear, and generous amounts of warm and moist air surrounding these storms are to blame. As Simon Redferm recently noted,¶ The recent IPCC report on climate change highlighted the risks associated with changes in the patterns and frequency of extreme weather events. While individual storms such as Haiyan cannot be directly attributed to such changes, the statistics of such storms will help build a picture of how climate change is affecting the planet. Climatologists are keen to develop models that provide accurate risk factors for tropical cyclones.¶ As the planet and particularly the oceans heat, simple physics indicates that the energy stored is likely to increase the intensity and frequency of devastating storms like Haiyan, at great cost to coastal communities.

#### Plan removes the ONLY barrier to hurricane cooperation

Boom 12 (Brian M. Boom - 08.14.2012; AAAS publication, director of the Caribbean Biodiversity Program and Bassett Maguire Curator of Botany at the New York Botanical Garden; “Biodiversity without Borders”; <http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/article/2012/biodiversity-without-borders>; kdub)

The most urgent environmental problems requiring bilateral action are broadly classified as disasters—both those that occur naturally and those that are man-made. Hurricanes are the clearest examples of shared natural disasters. During the twentieth century, 167 hurricanes struck the U.S. mainland. Of these, 62 were major (categories 3, 4, or 5 on the Saffir-Simpson scale). During the same period, 36 hurricanes, half of which were major, made landfall over Cuba. Because many hurricanes—Katrina and Ike being twenty-first century examples—strike both countries, there exists a shared need after such disasters to respond to the negative effects, including environmental problems created by rain, wind, and storm surges.¶ Most major hurricanes occurring in the Caribbean during the past century have resulted in documented extensive perturbations of shallow-water marine ecosystems, particularly to coral reefs, seagrass beds, and coastal mangroves.2 Aside from physical damage to such ecosystems from more turbulent water, hurricanes can also negatively impact water quality. On land, hurricane damage to ecosystems can be even more severe than in the ocean. For example, damaged native vegetation will possibly be more prone to colonization by exotic, noxious species such as Australian pine and Brazilian pepper.3 While Cuban and U.S. scientists have shared motivation to assess, monitor, and remediate the marine and terrestrial ecosystems that are damaged by hurricanes, they currently cannot do so.

#### That solves hurricane preparedness and response

Van Heerden 9 (Ivor van Heerden; doctorate degree in Marine Sciences and deputy director of the Louisiana State University Hurricane Center; “Avenues of Potential Cooperation Betweenthe U.S. and Cuba on Hurricane Preparednessand Disaster Management” published in “9 ways for us to talk to Cuba and for Cuba to talk to us”; The Center for Democracy in the Americas, an independent, non-profit organization that does not receive financial support from theU.S. or any foreign government; 2009; <http://www.scribd.co0m/doc/10323598/9-Ways-for-US-to-Talk-to-Cuba-and-for-Cuba-to-Talk-to-US>; kdub)

Exchanging information on hurricanes is one of the few areas where the U.S. and Cuba actually do talk to each other. The U.S. andCuba for years have enjoyed a very good working relationship, shar-ing meteorological data¶ 5¶ between the U.S. National Hurricane Center(NHC) and Cuba’sInstituto de Meteorología and Centro Nacional de¶ ¶ Prognósticos. Hurricane hunters based in the U.S. regularly cross Cuba’s air space with its government’s permission. But a foreign pol-icy that allows for the exchange of useful knowledge and transfer of technologies could significantly increase the benefit to both the U.S.and Cuba in dealing with these storms. Each nation has a lot to offer in emergency preparedness techniques and management experience. NHC’s web pages, for example, are invaluable. They display the latest predictions as to track, size, and inten-sity of a particular storm and update every few hours. The data is based on the latest science and technology available from the U.S., Canada and the U.K., and is the result of one hundred years of progress. In 1900, a hurricane stormed along the length of Cuba’s island, entered the Gulf of Mexico and headed northwest toward Texas. Cuba’s hurricane researchers, fostered in the local Jesuit community’s tradition of excellence, monitored this hurricane and predicted its track into the Gulf while American forecasters insisted the hurricane was 150 milesnortheast of Key West, and headed for the Atlantic Seaboard. U.S. fore-casters warned fishermen in¶ New Jersey ¶ to stay in port, but the storm struck Galveston, Texas, flattening that beach resort and port and killing at least 8,000 people: the deadliest storm tragedy in U.S. history.¶ 6¶ Even before Castro, U.S. forecasters did not respect the Cuban team, but their ignorance also reflected the state of hurricane forecast-ing at the time.¶ 7¶ If a storm didn’t leave a trail of firsthand reports and actual destruction while crossing the islands of the Caribbean or the Bahamas, forecasters had no way of tracking whether it even existed. This shortage of reliable information improved dramatically over the next century with the introduction of maritime radio, reconnais-sance aircraft, radar, satellite images of remote tropical areas and geo-stationary satellites to beam them every 30 minutes. Today, we measure or estimate air pressure, temperature, humidi-ty, and wind speed throughout a storm and the surrounding atmos-phere. Forecasters now have very good clues about a storm’s destina-tion and numerical prediction models to make reasonable determina-tions of storm surges.¶ 8¶ ¶ NHC’s abilities have been aided by ongoing research at universities and governmental agencies contributing to the many global and trop-ical weather models to predict tracks and intensities of storms, such as the “spaghetti track plots” commonly seen on television news when a storm threatens the U.S.The NHC’s famous “projection cone” grows larger in width as the distance (and time) from the storm center increases. It is an excellent visual depiction of the range of error in the prediction. Introduced in the mid-1990s, the cone has become narrower and narrower, as the forecasts have become more accurate and confident. All of these models depend on ground measurements, atmospheric column sampling (via weather balloon, aircraft dropsondes and satel-lite data). The better the data and the denser the sampling net, the more enhanced the product. Cuba’s island is 725 miles long, with an east-west orientation across the southern boundary of the Gulf of Mexico, separating that body of water from the Caribbean Sea. Given its meteorologically strategic location, to build up and be privy to critical scientific contri-butions from its neighbor would indisputably be in the national inter-est of the United States. The warm Loop Current entering from the Caribbean Sea is one of the heat engines that makes hurricanes intensify once they enter the Gulf. Were Cuba to maintain oceanographic and weather data buoys in the Yucatán Channel between Mexico and Cuba, their data would prove invaluable. Knowing more about a storm’s 3-D struc-ture would aid our understanding of air-sea interactions and benefit hurricane scientists and prediction modelers infinitely. Unfortunately, such participation by Cuba is beyond their technological capability and the U.S.-imposed embargo forbids our supplying the necessary equipment. Cuba does have several weather stations, but the embargo hinders them from upgrading or building more. Cuba relies on the EuropeanUnion and other countries (principally China) for equipment andparts. American-made weather stations, Doppler radar systems and¶ other equipment would be more reliable and could be supplied at a better cost resulting in more and better meteorological data to improve U.S. hurricane prediction ability. W hile tropical cyclone tracking is a very important part of disaster management, it’s only one facet. Cooperation with Cuba in other hur-ricane response activities is nearly non-existent. Although monetary costs from storms devastate and demoralize — human lives also hang in the balance. The saving of lives is of paramount importance in disas-ter management. Consider this astounding contrast: More than 1,600 Americans died during Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the U.S. death toll from Hurricane Ike in 2008 could exceed one hundred. Cuba’s death rate from storms over this same period was about three persons per year; its loss of lifedue to Ike was comparatively minimalcompared to losses in the U.S. Only sevenCubans died from Ike.¶ 9¶ This difference in death rates between the so-called “third world country” and the United States is striking. Cuba has bet-ter evacuation plans, superior post disas-ter medical support, and more advanced citizen disaster preparedness education programs. Their strengths point to a host of potential path- ways for future cooperation with the U.S. While there are distinct cul-tural differences between the U.S. and Cuba, with so much at stake, a free-flowing exchange of ideas could allow both sides to learn from each other. Although Cuba is less densely populated than the U.S., the main reason for Cuba’s extraordinary survival record is the high priority Cubans place on saving lives and thus planning evacuations. The¶ ¶ Cuban evacuation process starts at the local community level, wheresuburban or subdivision “block captains,” who are paid by the gov-ernment, go from house to house to determine everyone’s needs. All Cubans know that if they evacuate, their medical needs will be met. Medicines are free and stockpiled before an emergency. The local block captains have an inventory of medical needs. This informationis supplied to authorities before each storm. Recent research from the Louisiana State University Hurricane Center¶ 10¶ has shown that about half the 1,600 people who died during Katrina succumbed because the failed response included a lack of access to important medicines. Duplicating the block captainapproach should be doable in the U.S. If Cuban scientists and emer-gency managers were free to travel to the U.S. to meet with their U.S. counterparts, they could provide instruction and advice on these measures. During hurricane season, the average Cuban citizen has impressive knowledge about hurricane impacts and what to do during an evacua-tion. The dissemination of knowledge comes through disaster aware-ness education programs that start in primary school and continue through adulthood. Since the devastating Hurricane Flora in 1963,Cubans have perfected an education program that discourages panic inthe population and abates undue fear in small children, while providinga fundamental understanding of hurricanes and their impact from anearly age. While evacuations are sometimes mandatory in Cuba, even when Cubans have the option to, very few stay in harm’s way.Research has shown that one way to educate adults is by teachingtheir children. The U.S. could benefit enormously by adapting thissystem that works so well. At a recent meeting in Gulfport, Mississippi,organized by the Center for International Policy, emergency managersfrom the U.S. who had recently toured Cuba all came to the sameconclusion: We need to duplicate Cuba’s disaster preparedness edu-cation system here at home.¶ 11¶ During Hurricane Ike, Cuban disaster officials evacuated 2 mil-lion persons. U.S. scientists and emergency managers could benefit¶ ¶ enormously observing a Cuban storm evacuation in real time. TheU.S. has never achieved this level of success. Images of those strand-ed at the New Orleans Superdome during Hurricane Katrina are for-ever etched in American minds. Huge traffic snarl-ups occurred inTexas when Hurricane Rita threatened the greater Houston area in2005 and nearly 100 people died,¶ 12¶ from a failed process that left thousands stranded on the interstate without food, water, fuel and medical support for hours. Although we’ve made some progress in improving evacuations — using both lanes of an interstate (contraflow), upgrading interstate intersections and staging coastal withdrawals — we’ve got a long way to go. Poor, elderly, and infirm people stay under duress while others willingly choose to stay behind, despite information and warnings on American TV and radio. Death is an inevitable outcome. While the current sanctions allow scientific visits to Cuba under cer-tain circumstances, they are hampered by an onerous licensing process under the auspices of the U.S. Treasury Department. The rules that restrict scientists — and Americans in general — from traveling to Cuba must be lifted. They are impeding the free flow of ideas that could ben-efit both countries in emergency management. No matter how much our government may decry the Cuban regime, it is a fact that they are very successful in orchestrating evacuations and meeting the public health and medical needs of their population during disasters. An exchange of ideas always benefits those involved. We have a rapidly growing Spanish speaking immigrant population — many of whom are drawn to coastal cities such as New Orleans. To lift travel restrictions and encourage two-way dialogue will improve the well-being of both populations. In this day of high speed digital data trans-fer, U.S.-Cuban cooperation could be well-developed, but collabora-tion has been hindered by the myopic view of mostly U.S. adminis-trators and politicians.

#### Scenario 1 is the grid

#### The grid is vulnerable now a new superstorm will crush it in the wake of Sandy – a coordinated strategy is key to resilience which mitigates storms’ impact

Abi-Samra 13 (Nicholas Abi-Samra is a senior member of IEEE, a professional engineer, and senior vice president, electricity transmission and distribution, at DNV GL; 06 November 2013; “One Year Later: Superstorm Sandy Underscores Need for a Resilient Grid”; <http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/the-smarter-grid/one-year-later-superstorm-sandy-underscores-need-for-a-resilient-grid>; kdub)

On the evening of 29 October 2012, Superstorm Sandy made landfall in southern New Jersey, near Atlantic City. At that point, it was officially classified as a “post-tropical cyclone,” but the label masked the storm’s enormous reach and destructiveness. As Sandy’s multiple weather systems collided over the most densely populated region of the United States, 24 states, including the entire Eastern Seaboard, from Florida to Maine, and west to Michigan and Wisconsin, experienced the storm’s wrath. In the United States, the estimated damage totaled US $65 billion, and at least 181 people died.¶ Entire neighborhoods in coastal areas were wiped out, ground transportation was disrupted for days, a quarter of the cellphone sites in 10 states went down. But Sandy took its worst toll on the electricity grid. In all, more than 8.5 million households and businesses—that is, tens of millions of people—experienced power outages, and in some places, restoring power took weeks. Wastewater treatment plants up and down the mid-Atlantic lost power and failed, sending billions of gallons of raw or only partially treated sewage into the region’s waterways. The storm made it painfully clear to all how fragile the aging U.S. power-system infrastructure is.¶ What has also become clear is that completely hardening the power system to extreme weather—making it invulnerable to damage—is close to impossible. The power engineering community is therefore looking at holistic approaches based on “grid resiliency.” This includes traditional tactics, such as upgrading power poles and trimming trees near power lines. But it also encompasses newer approaches, such as microgrids and energy storage, which allow operators to quickly reconfigure the system when portions of the grid go down. Implicit to such plans is the need to ensure uninterrupted power to critical sites such as oil and gas refineries, water-treatment plants, and telecommunication networks, as well as gasoline stations, hospitals, and pharmacies.¶ Some of the nation’s leaders seem receptive to such approaches. In recent meetings in Washington, D.C., two congressmen from New York state, whose districts suffered some of the worst damage during Sandy, expressed support for grid resiliency. Peter King, a Republican who represents a district on the South Shore of Long Island, said, “It is imperative that our critical systems and facilities are resilient and operate in the face of catastrophic events such as Superstorm Sandy. Spending now on mitigation efforts can save lives and diminish the large costs associated with recovery efforts.” Steve Israel, a Democrat who represents Long Island’s North Shore, agreed: “We learned the hard way from Hurricane Sandy that we must invest in an infrastructure that can withstand and recover from extreme weather. That’s why I believe that we must both harden our infrastructure and ensure it is resilient to future extreme weather events.”¶ A Storm’s Toll on the Grid¶ Power systems are vulnerable to extreme weather in many forms—floods, windstorms, ice storms, snowstorms, hurricanes, heat waves, prolonged droughts that trigger wildfires, and so on. Various studies have concluded that storm-related power outages cost the U.S. economy between $20 billion and $55 billion in a typical year. Data also suggest that outages from weather-related events are on the rise.¶ For the grid, flooding is the worst of these extreme weather events because of the long-term damage that floodwater can do to power substations and to underground electrical systems. During Superstorm Sandy, for instance, the storm surge sent water sloshing into many underground substations in New York City, leading to widespread outages. Restoring a flooded substation takes much longer than restoring a downed power line that’s been damaged by ice or wind because you have to deal with the large amounts of water, rust, and mud left trapped in the structure.¶ Switchgear, relay panels, transformer fans, pumps, and control kiosks are among the most susceptible pieces of substation equipment. Once all the water has been pumped out, each piece of equipment must be thoroughly dried and cleaned; even small amounts of moisture and dirt can render some electric equipment inoperable. Breaker mechanisms may have to be disassembled and cleaned manually, and items such as bearings, pins, cylinders, rings, latches, and gaskets may need to be replaced.¶ If the flooding is from salt water, as was the case in many areas hit by Sandy, repairs may be even more involved: Prolonged saltwater exposure can damage cables, motors, metal fasteners, and electronic parts and can cause short circuits. Repairing or replacing some equipment is complicated by the fact that a lot of it is old (sometimes more than 50 years old) and obsolete.¶ The Limits of Hardening¶ In the aftermath of the severe hurricanes in the 2000s, regulatory bodies in Florida, Texas, and a few other states mandated that their utilities either adopt or investigate hardening options for their systems. For example, Rule 25-6.0342 of the Florida Administrative Code, which went into effect in 2007, requires investor-owned electric utilities in that state to file a “storm hardening plan” with the Florida Public Service Commission every three years. The plan must include a detailed description of the construction standards, policies, and procedures that the utility is using to enhance the reliability of overhead and underground electrical transmission and distribution facilities.¶ The most common hardening practice is replacing wooden utility poles with poles made of steel, concrete, or a composite material and upgrading transmission towers from aluminum to galvanized-steel lattice or concrete. Installing guy wires and other structural supports is another common tactic, as is increasing the number of poles per kilometer of line. Such measures are all intended to allow the pole, tower, or other structure to better withstand windstorms, including hurricane-force winds, as well as ice storms and snowstorms.¶ Hardening is an obvious way to seek improvement. Wood shrinks and weakens as it ages; insects, woodpeckers, and rot can also weaken a wood pole. The original design strength of conductors can also decline with age due to corrosion. An older, weakened wood pole hit by a 160-kilometer-per-hour wind can quickly fail. In the United States, the National Electrical Safety Code defines how much wind a utility pole should be able to endure.¶ But even if every pole and tower were upgraded to concrete or steel, we would still experience storm-related outages. The reason is that flying debris (such as roofs and road signs) and vegetation (such as falling trees and tree limbs) are the primary causes of distribution-pole damage during a storm, not strong winds themselves. Thus, changing pole designs to meet extreme wind standards may unnecessarily increase costs without really improving the overall resiliency of the network.¶ Given that vegetation does pose a real problem for power lines, tree trimming is another major component of grid hardening. Data from past storms have shown, for example, that tree-related failures increase exponentially when wind speeds exceed 100 km/h. So, routine maintenance of distribution and transmission lines inevitably includes clearing trees and other vegetation from power-line right-of-ways (that is, the areas immediately surrounding the line).¶ Here, too, though, such measures are not a cure-all. In high-wind situations, for instance, the risk of airborne debris coming from trees outside the right-of-way can exceed the risk from trees within the right-of-way by a factor of 3 or 4 to 1. And while increasing the number of poles per kilometer of line can reduce wind-related outages in certain areas (specifically those places where storm damage tends to result from direct failures of poles and other hardware), if the storm damage instead tends to come from debris and vegetation that cause the poles to fail, this approach can actually result in more pole failures rather than fewer.¶ Burying Cables Is Not the Answer¶ After any severe storm in which power lines go down, people often talk about taking existing overhead lines and facilities and placing them underground as a solution. This practice does work nicely in certain situations, such as at intersections of major highways. But burying cables is not the best answer in all cases.¶ During the hurricane season of 2005, for example, utilities reported that underground assets in some coastal communities were washed out to the ocean; overhead equipment, they said, might have sped up restoration work. A number of utilities have also identified areas where existing underground equipment has been prone to frequent flooding and should therefore be replaced with overhead equipment. And burying power lines is costly. Converting overhead lines to underground lines can cost $2M per mile (about $1.2M per KM), according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. When North Carolina considered the idea of burying its power lines 10 years ago, experts concluded that it would cost $41 billion and take more than 25 years.¶ How to Build Resiliency Into the Grid¶ Unlike grid hardening, resiliency measures aren’t intended to prevent damage from extreme weather; rather, they minimize the impact of any damage by enabling electric facilities to continue operating and promoting a rapid return to normal operations after damage and outages occur.¶ Making the power distribution system more resilient starts with changes in the design. It may be advantageous, for example, to split up a large network into smaller circuits, and to reexamine the circuit arrangements to enhance the speed of repair. Greater deployment of smart grid technology can also help. When an electrical outage occurs, the smart grid’s intelligent switches can detect a short circuit, block power flows to the affected area, communicate with other nearby switches, and then reroute power around the problem to keep as many customers energized as possible. Because these intelligent switches can do all this automatically or under the control of remote operators, they can reduce the time it takes to restore power to just a few minutes, rather than the hours, days, or even weeks it can take a repair crew to arrive on the scene and restore circuits manually.¶ During Sandy, a number of locations in the affected areas still had electricity, because they had both on-site power generation and the means to operate independently of the grid. The College of New Jersey, New York University, Princeton University, and Stony Brook University each used a combined heat and power (CHP) plant on campus to keep the lights and heat on during and after Sandy. New York University’s case was particularly vivid because the area immediately surrounding it in downtown Manhattan was completely blacked out. Thanks to NYU’s 13.4-megawatt CHP plant and its self-sufficient microgrid system, which distributes electricity independently of the main utility grid, 26 of its buildings still had electricity. (On the other hand, the NYU Langone Medical Center, located on the eastern edge of midtown Manhattan, suffered significant flooding, which knocked out emergency power and forced the evacuation of hundreds of patients.)¶ How exactly do microgrids help in such situations? Microgrids are electrical systems that can operate either autonomously or as part of a larger electric grid. To do that, they need at least one distributed energy resource, such as the CHP plant at NYU, or an energy-storage facility, such as a large-scale battery installation. These resources provide energy to the microgrid, and they can be disconnected from and reconnected to the utility with minimal disruption.¶ When a microgrid is operating independently of the larger grid, it must be able to prioritize where it supplies power so that critical buildings, like hospitals, continue to receive uninterrupted power. If the outage is expected to last only a short while, the microgrid may be able to meet everyone’s power needs; for a longer outage, it may be able to supply power only to critical loads. Decisions about load management, therefore, require assessing how long the microgrid will be operating in isolation. A dynamic microgrid will be able to expand or contract its load requirements depending on the available generation and the priority of the load to be served.¶ Ultimately, a resilient grid would comprise many microgrids, which could, in the face of a major storm, split into a controlled set of independently survivable islands. Power engineers are also looking at using such dynamic microgrids to help stitch the system back together after a major storm; each microgrid can be thought of as an “island” of balanced supply and demand that can make recovery efforts faster.¶ As the memories of Superstorm Sandy recede, we must not let our guard down. Ensuring resiliency of the grid against extreme weather will require not just hardening utility structures but also enabling electric facilities to continue operating despite damage and promoting a rapid return to normal operations after the storm has passed. We must also carefully consider how to protect critical power loads and infrastructures, and we need to develop a resilient power strategy for communications, gas, and water systems, to make them less vulnerable to disaster. If we can make the electrical grid smarter and more flexible, the impact of even the worst storm can be minimized.

#### Grid failure causes nuclear meltdowns

Capiello 11(Dina, Huffington Post, “Long Blackouts Pose Risk To U.S. Nuclear Reactors” 3/29/11 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/29/blackout-risk-us-nuclear-reactors\_n\_841869.html)

A 2003 federal analysis looking at how to estimate the risk of containment failure said that should power be knocked out by an earthquake or tornado it "would be unlikely that power will be recovered in the time frame to prevent core meltdown." In Japan, it was a one-two punch: first the earthquake, then the tsunami. Tokyo Electric Power Co., the operator of the crippled plant, found other ways to cool the reactor core and so far avert a full-scale meltdown without electricity. "Clearly the coping duration is an issue on the table now," said Biff Bradley, director of risk assessment for the Nuclear Energy Institute. "The industry and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will have to go back in light of what we just observed and rethink station blackout duration." David Lochbaum, a former plant engineer and nuclear safety director at the advocacy group Union of Concerned Scientists, put it another way: "Japan shows what happens when you play beat-the-clock and lose." Lochbaum plans to use the Japan disaster to press lawmakers and the nuclear power industry to do more when it comes to coping with prolonged blackouts, such as having temporary generators on site that can recharge batteries. A complete loss of electrical power, generally speaking, poses a major problem for a nuclear power plant because the reactor core must be kept cool, and back-up cooling systems – mostly pumps that replenish the core with water\_ require massive amounts of power to work. Without the electrical grid, or diesel generators, batteries can be used for a time, but they will not last long with the power demands. And when the batteries die, the systems that control and monitor the plant can also go dark, making it difficult to ascertain water levels and the condition of the core. One variable not considered in the NRC risk assessments of severe blackouts was cooling water in spent fuel pools, where rods once used in the reactor are placed. With limited resources, the commission decided to focus its analysis on the reactor fuel, which has the potential to release more radiation. An analysis of individual plant risks released in 2003 by the NRC shows that for 39 of the 104 nuclear reactors, the risk of core damage from a blackout was greater than 1 in 100,000. At 45 other plants the risk is greater than 1 in 1 million, the threshold NRC is using to determine which severe accidents should be evaluated in its latest analysis. The Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1, in Pennsylvania had the greatest risk of core melt – 6.5 in 100,000, according to the analysis. But that risk may have been reduced in subsequent years as NRC regulations required plants to do more to cope with blackouts. Todd Schneider, a spokesman for FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co., which runs Beaver Creek, told the AP that batteries on site would last less than a week. In 1988, eight years after labeling blackouts "an unresolved safety issue," the NRC required nuclear power plants to improve the reliability of their diesel generators, have more backup generators on site, and better train personnel to restore power. These steps would allow them to keep the core cool for four to eight hours if they lost all electrical power. By contrast, the newest generation of nuclear power plant, which is still awaiting approval, can last 72 hours without taking any action, and a minimum of seven days if water is supplied by other means to cooling pools. Despite the added safety measures, a 1997 report found that blackouts – the loss of on-site and off-site electrical power – remained "a dominant contributor to the risk of core melt at some plants." The events of Sept. 11, 2001, further solidified that nuclear reactors might have to keep the core cool for a longer period without power. After 9/11, the commission issued regulations requiring that plants have portable power supplies for relief valves and be able to manually operate an emergency reactor cooling system when batteries go out. The NRC says these steps, and others, have reduced the risk of core melt from station blackouts from the current fleet of nuclear plants. For instance, preliminary results of the latest analysis of the risks to the Peach Bottom plant show that any release caused by a blackout there would be far less rapid and would release less radiation than previously thought, even without any actions being taken. With more time, people can be evacuated. The NRC says improved computer models, coupled with up-to-date information about the plant, resulted in the rosier outlook. "When you simplify, you always err towards the worst possible circumstance," Scott Burnell, a spokesman for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, said of the earlier studies. The latest work shows that "even in situations where everything is broken and you can't do anything else, these events take a long time to play out," he said. "Even when you get to releasing into environment, much less of it is released than actually thought." Exelon Corp., the operator of the Peach Bottom plant, referred all detailed questions about its preparedness and the risk analysis back to the NRC. In a news release issued earlier this month, the company, which operates 10 nuclear power plants, said "all Exelon nuclear plants are able to safely shut down and keep the fuel cooled even without electricity from the grid." Other people, looking at the crisis unfolding in Japan, aren't so sure. In the worst-case scenario, the NRC's 1990 risk assessment predicted that a core melt at Peach Bottom could begin in one hour if electrical power on- and off-site were lost, the diesel generators – the main back-up source of power for the pumps that keep the core cool with water – failed to work and other mitigating steps weren't taken. "It is not a question that those things are definitely effective in this kind of scenario," said Richard Denning, a professor of nuclear engineering at Ohio State University, referring to the steps NRC has taken to prevent incidents. Denning had done work as a contractor on severe accident analyses for the NRC since 1975. He retired from Battelle Memorial Institute in 1995. "They certainly could have made all the difference in this particular case," he said, referring to Japan. "That's assuming you have stored these things in a place that would not have been swept away by tsunami."

#### Extinction

Lendman ‘11 (Stephen – BA from Harvard University and MBA from Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, “Nuclear Meltdown in Japan” 3/13/11 <http://rense.com/general93/nucmelt.htm>)

For years, Helen Caldicott warned it's coming. In her 1978 book, "Nuclear Madness," she said: "As a physician, I contend that nuclear technology threatens life on our planet with extinction. If present trends continue, theair we breathe, the food we eat, and the water we drink will soon becontaminated with enough radioactive pollutants to pose a potential health hazard far greater than any plague humanity has ever experienced." More below on the inevitable dangers from commercial nuclear power proliferation, besides added military ones. On March 11, New York Times writer Martin Fackler headlined, "Powerful Quake and Tsunami Devastate Northern Japan," saying: "The 8.9-magnitude earthquake (Japan's strongest ever) set off a devastating tsunami that sent walls of water (six meters high) washing over coastal cities in the north." According to Japan's Meteorological Survey, it was 9.0. The Sendai port city and other areas experienced heavy damage. "Thousands of homes were destroyed, many roads were impassable, trains and buses (stopped) running, and power and cellphones remained down. On Saturday morning, the JR rail company" reported three trains missing. Many passengers are unaccounted for. Striking at 2:46PM Tokyo time, it caused vast destruction, shook city skyscrapers, buckled highways, ignited fires, terrified millions, annihilated areas near Sendai, possibly killed thousands, and caused a nuclear meltdown, its potential catastrophic effects far exceeding quake and tsunami devastation, almost minor by comparison under a worst case scenario. On March 12, Times writer Matthew Wald headlined, "Explosion Seen at Damaged Japan Nuclear Plant," saying: "Japanese officials (ordered evacuations) for people living near two nuclear power plants whose cooling systems broke down," releasing radioactive material, perhaps in far greater amounts than reported. NHK television and Jiji said the 40-year old Fukushima plant's outer structure housing the reactor "appeared to have blown off, which could suggest the containment building had already been breached." Japan's nuclear regulating agency said radioactive levels inside were 1,000 times above normal. Reuters said the 1995 Kobe quake caused $100 billion in damage, up to then the most costly ever natural disaster. This time, from quake and tsunami damage alone, that figure will be dwarfed. Moreover, under a worst case core meltdown, all bets are off as the entire region and beyond will be threatened with permanent contamination, making the most affected areas unsafe to live in. On March 12, Stratfor Global Intelligence issued a "Red Alert: Nuclear Meltdown at Quake-Damaged Japanese Plant," saying: Fukushima Daiichi "nuclear power plant in Okuma, Japan, appears to have caused a reactor meltdown." Stratfor downplayed its seriousness, adding that such an event "does not necessarily mean a nuclear disaster," that already may have happened - the ultimate nightmare short of nuclear winter. According to Stratfor, "(A)s long as the reactor core, which is specifically designed to contain high levels of heat, pressure and radiation, remains intact, the melted fuel can be dealt with. If the (core's) breached but the containment facility built around (it) remains intact, the melted fuel can be....entombed within specialized concrete" as at Chernobyl in 1986. In fact, that disaster killed nearly one million people worldwide from nuclear radiation exposure. In their book titled, "Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment," Alexey Yablokov, Vassily Nesterenko and Alexey Nesterenko said: "For the past 23 years, it has been clear that there is a danger greater than nuclear weapons concealed within nuclear power. Emissions from this one reactor exceeded a hundred-fold the radioactive contamination of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki." "No citizen of any country can be assured that he or she can be protected from radioactive contamination. One nuclear reactor can pollute half the globe. Chernobyl fallout covers the entire Northern Hemisphere." Stratfor explained that if Fukushima's floor cracked, "it is highly likely that the melting fuel will burn through (its) containment system and enter the ground. This has never happened before," at least not reported. If now occurring, "containment goes from being merely dangerous, time consuming and expensive to nearly impossible," making the quake, aftershocks, and tsunamis seem mild by comparison. Potentially, millions of lives will be jeopardized. Japanese officials said Fukushima's reactor container wasn't breached. Stratfor and others said it was, making the potential calamity far worse than reported. Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) said the explosion at Fukushima's Saiichi No. 1 facility could only have been caused by a core meltdown. In fact, 3 or more reactors are affected or at risk. Events are fluid and developing, but remain very serious. The possibility of an extreme catastrophe can't be discounted. Moreover, independent nuclear safety analyst John Large told Al Jazeera that by venting radioactive steam from the inner reactor to the outer dome, a reaction may have occurred, causing the explosion. "When I look at the size of the explosion," he said, "it is my opinion that there could be a very large leak (because) fuel continues to generate heat." Already, Fukushima way exceeds Three Mile Island that experienced a partial core meltdown in Unit 2. Finally it was brought under control, but coverup and denial concealed full details until much later. According to anti-nuclear activist Harvey Wasserman, Japan's quake fallout may cause nuclear disaster, saying: "This is a very serious situation. If the cooling system fails (apparently it has at two or more plants), the super-heated radioactive fuel rods will melt, and (if so) you could conceivably have an explosion," that, in fact, occurred. As a result, massive radiation releases may follow, impacting the entire region. "It could be, literally, an apocalyptic event. The reactor could blow." If so, Russia, China, Korea and most parts of Western Asia will be affected. Many thousands will die, potentially millions under a worse case scenario, including far outside East Asia. Moreover, at least five reactors are at risk. Already, a 20-mile wide radius was evacuated. What happened in Japan can occur anywhere. Yet Obama's proposed budget includes $36 billion for new reactors, a shocking disregard for global safety. Calling Fukushima an "apocalyptic event," Wasserman said "(t)hese nuclear plants have to be shut," let alone budget billions for new ones. It's unthinkable, he said. If a similar disaster struck California, nuclear fallout would affect all America, Canada, Mexico, Central America, and parts of South America. Nuclear Power: A Technology from Hell Nuclear expert Helen Caldicott agrees, telling this writer by phone that a potential regional catastrophe is unfolding. Over 30 years ago, she warned of its inevitability. Her 2006 book titled, "Nuclear Power is Not the Answer" explained that contrary to government and industry propaganda, even during normal operations, nuclear power generation causes significant discharges of greenhouse gas emissions, as well as hundreds of thousands of curies of deadly radioactive gases and other radioactive elements into the environment every year. Moreover, nuclear plants are atom bomb factories. A 1000 megawatt reactor produces 500 pounds of plutonium annually. Only 10 are needed for a bomb able to devastate a large city, besides causing permanent radiation contamination. Nuclear Power not Cleaner and Greener Just the opposite, in fact. Although a nuclear power plant releases no carbon dioxide (CO2), the primary greenhouse gas, a vast infrastructure is required. Called the nuclear fuel cycle, it uses large amounts of fossil fuels. Each cycle stage exacerbates the problem, starting with the enormous cost of mining and milling uranium, needing fossil fuel to do it. How then to dispose of mill tailings, produced in the extraction process. It requires great amounts of greenhouse emitting fuels to remediate. Moreover, other nuclear cycle steps also use fossil fuels, including converting uranium to hexafluoride gas prior to enrichment, the enrichment process itself, and conversion of enriched uranium hexafluoride gas to fuel pellets. In addition, nuclear power plant construction, dismantling and cleanup at the end of their useful life require large amounts of energy. There's more, including contaminated cooling water, nuclear waste, its handling, transportation and disposal/storage, problems so far unresolved. Moreover, nuclear power costs and risks are so enormous that the industry couldn't exist without billions of government subsidized funding annually. The Unaddressed Human Toll from Normal Operations Affected are uranium miners, industry workers, and potentially everyone living close to nuclear reactors that routinely emit harmful radioactive releases daily, harming human health over time, causing illness and early death. The link between radiation exposure and disease is irrefutable, depending only on the amount of cumulative exposure over time, Caldicott saying: "If a regulatory gene is biochemically altered by radiation exposure, the cell will begin to incubate cancer, during a 'latent period of carcinogenesis,' lasting from two to sixty years." In fact, a single gene mutation can prove fatal. No amount of radiation exposure is safe. Moreover, when combined with about 80,000 commonly used toxic chemicals and contaminated GMO foods and ingredients, it causes 80% of known cancers, putting everyone at risk everywhere. Further, the combined effects of allowable radiation exposure, uranium mining, milling operations, enrichment, and fuel fabrication can be devastating to those exposed. Besides the insoluble waste storage/disposal problem, nuclear accidents happen and catastrophic ones are inevitable. Inevitable Meltdowns Caldicott and other experts agree they're certain in one or more of the hundreds of reactors operating globally, many years after their scheduled shutdown dates unsafely. Combined with human error, imprudently minimizing operating costs, internal sabotage, or the effects of a high-magnitude quake and/or tsunami, an eventual catastrophe is certain. Aging plants alone, like Japan's Fukushima facility, pose unacceptable risks based on their record of near-misses and meltdowns, resulting from human error, old equipment, shoddy maintenance, and poor regulatory oversight. However, under optimum operating conditions, all nuclear plants are unsafe. Like any machine or facility, they're vulnerable to breakdowns, that if serious enough can cause enormous, possibly catastrophic, harm. Add nuclear war to the mix, also potentially inevitable according to some experts, by accident or intent, including Steven Starr saying: "Only a single failure of nuclear deterrence is required to start a nuclear war," the consequences of which "would be profound, potentially killing "tens of millions of people, and caus(ing) long-term, catastrophic disruptions of the global climate and massive destruction of Earth's protective ozone layer. The result would be a global nuclear famine that could kill up to one billion people." Worse still is nuclear winter, the ultimate nightmare, able to end all life if it happens. It's nuclear proliferation's unacceptable risk, a clear and present danger as long as nuclear weapons and commercial dependency exist. In 1946, Enstein knew it, saying: "Our world faces a crisis as yet unperceived by those possessing the power to make great decisions for good and evil. The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe." He envisioned two choices - abolish all forms of nuclear power or face extinction. No one listened. The Doomsday Clock keeps ticking.

#### Scenario 2 is credibility

#### Disaster response is perceived and affects every aspect of global perception of the US

Farazmand 7 (Ali Farazmand is a professor of public administration at Florida Atlantic University, where he teaches courses on theory and behavior, personnel, bureaucratic politics, ethics, governance, and globalization. His research and publications include more than 18 authored and edited books and handbooks, founding editor of the refereed journal Public Organization Review, now in its seventh volume; “Learning from the Katrina Crisis: A Global and International Perspective with Implications for Future Crisis Management”; 7 DEC 2007; Public Administration Review, 67: 149–159; kdub)

Katrina: A global case of grand failure in governance and emergency management¶ If there is any single phrase to characterize Katrina crisis management, it is “grand failure.” This grand failure was manifest in every dimension of governance and public administration at all levels. However, what is most disturbing about this catastrophic disaster is the “global perspective and international implications” that this grand failure produced for governance and public administration worldwide. Scholarly and governmental studies have examined the Katrina crisis extensively, and there is a growing body of literature on what went wrong during that disaster and what can be done to prevent similar crises in the future. Katrina studies will continue to cover areas of governance and public administration, emergency and crisis management, and the capacity to manage crises and emergencies for the foreseeable future. Sadly, there are few, if any, success stories coming out of the Katrina case. Thus, this short essay will not detail what went wrong during Katrina and how the ensuing crisis was mismanaged. This has been documented by others (e.g., in U.S. congressional hearings, published articles, and books; see, in particular, Brennan and Koven, forthcoming; Farazmand, forthcoming; Kiefer and Montjoy 2006; Schneider 2005; Wise 2006), as well as in this special issue of PAR.¶ What is missing in most of these studies, however, is the global and international perspective of this grand failure in governance and public management and the serious implications it may have produced for global crisis management, international peace and security, and future emergency management theory and practice worldwide. As part of this study, this author has conducted more than 47 personal interviews with ordinary people, professional administrators and public managers, academic scholars, and crisis and emergency managers from 13 countries. This brief section addresses—through a positive lens—a short list of the critical failures that were identified by respondents, with the hope of articulating several major “global lessons” learned from the Katrina crisis that may serve as principles central to effective crisis and emergency management in the future. Finally, to advance knowledge and improve the practice of emergency governance and crisis management, a suggestive “theory of anticipatory surprise management” is offered.¶ Global observations and perspectives of the Katrina crisis management may be grouped into three major areas: (1) the governance capacity to manage Katrina-like emergencies and crises by advanced countries such as the United States; (2) the ability of nation-states to cope with chaotic crises and extreme emergencies and the United States’ role in the global community; and (3) the strategic global and international implications of this grand failure for the United States as a superpower.¶ Regarding the first, the entire world of global institutions, peoples, and governments watched with unbelievable shock how the world’s most advanced nation was caught by complete surprise, unprepared and unable to cope with the Katrina crisis. The world observed with disbelief a disaster mismanagement system quickly turning into a profound management and leadership crises. The capacity to govern under extreme crisis is paralyzing no matter how powerful and resourceful a country is. The situation in New Orleans looked like an extremely underdeveloped African nation, hopelessly trying to get the attention of the world, and yet nothing was happening. This was an ugly picture the world took notice of; it was not just bad governance but “ugly” governance. Sadly, this ugly picture also translated, in the eyes of the global community of friends and foes alike who followed its development with sympathy and disbelief, into more implications for democratic governance, human rights, and the role of race, color, and minority status in American society.¶ In response to this author’s inquiry about what they thought of the crisis situation, the vast majority (45 out of 47) of interviewees seemed to wonder, “If this is what happens to American people on their own land, what would the people of the world in developing countries expect of America in similar situations?” This is a devastating observation with far-reaching implications for modern governance and international relations. Undoubtedly, the image of the United States was tarnished in the global community. But perhaps a more disturbing impact of the Katrina crisis has focused on its “capacity to cope with and manage multiple crises and emergency situations.” What would happen if two or three Katrina crises hit a country like the United States, a country that stages wars on other nations and extends its military forces through more than 737 bases to at least 100 nations worldwide? (Bartholomew 2006; Hoffmann 2006).¶ Katrina crisis mismanagement and governance failure also affected the ability of nation-states to cope with crises and emergencies in two ways, negative as well as positive. Sadly, the negative impact was a psychological one, reinforcing the traditional perspective of viewing disasters and crises as acts of God—unexpected, unprepared, and unbelievable, and therefore something about which little or nothing can be done (Hewitt 1983; Rosenthal, Boin, and Comfort 2001). The inability of the United States to cope with the Katrina crisis has produced a fatalistic and helpless attitude in many poor and developing countries toward the management of serious disasters. Paradoxically, at the same time, the positive impact of the Katrina crisis has also been observed across the globe—that is, a stronger feeling of self-reliance, self-confidence, and self-capacity building for future crisis management. “Actually, we have not been doing bad at all, we have done even better in many cases,” is the sentiment that many interviewees shared with this author. This attitude has a motivational effect on promoting confidence and building capacity among developing nations. We may therefore consider the ability of nation-states to cope with serious crises to be positively or negatively affected by other nation-states’ success or failure in coping with and managing disasters and crisis situations. We may also expect a greater role for the United Nations in promoting crisis prevention, preparation, and response systems across the world as globalization accelerates, with differential consequences affecting nation-states unequally.¶ Perhaps the most important long-term impact of Katrina crisis mismanagement is to be found in its implications for the United States as a superpower in the global community. This is the least considered and most highly neglected scholarly subject, and yet it is the most important global perspective on the Katrina crisis. Great powers, mighty empires, and strong governments are often tested by small and unexpected or sudden crises and chaotic incidents. This is a test of history, and most great powers have failed—with far-reaching consequences. In chaos theory, this is called a “butterfly effect”: A small but chaotic change may produce large-scale changes by sending severe shock waves into the nerve systems of an empire, an organization, or an organism, pushing the system to the edge of chaos and breakdown, with unpredictable outcomes.¶ The ability of the system to survive a potential breakdown is highly dependent on its quality of self-reorganization and self-renewal, that is, its ability to return the system to a state of autopoiesis (Farazmand 2004; Morgan 2007; Prigogine 1984). Katrina crisis management failures sent a shock wave throughout the world, especially among developing and less developed nations, their people, and revolutionary organizations worldwide regarding the ability and capacity of the United States as a globally hegemonic superpower acting as a “global empire” and claiming to dominate the entire world (Freeman and Kagarlitsky 2004; Hoffmann 2006; Johnson 2002). The Katrina grand failure broke the myth of U.S. global power in the eyes of millions of people worldwide, and certainly in the eyes of the people and revolutionary organizations or governments feeling dominated and exploited by the United States.¶ The motivation to challenge this global hegemony has certainly become stronger after Katrina than before, as the weakness of this superpower has been exposed through Katrina and the Iraq War. What would happen if the United States faced several simultaneous crises of revolution across the globe challenging its hegemonic dominance, say, in Latin America, Africa, and Asia? How would the U.S. government cope with two or three Katrina crises and perhaps more 9/11 situations? These are serious questions with long-term implications for the United States among its allies and adversaries. International relations are shaped by power positions and the ability of nation-states to exercise diplomacy and politics in regional and global affairs, and this ability is tested by time, crises, and the capacity to govern during extreme emergencies (Dror 2001). A global perspective on this observation is that the United States’ image as a superpower seems to have been seriously eroded by the administrative response to Katrina, a perspective that has been reinforced by the Bush administration’s deepening failures in Iraq and the broader Middle East.¶ As a global case of grand failure, the Katrina crisis revealed a number of failures that can inform future crisis and emergency management theory and practice. Evidence shows there was prior knowledge that, as a result of land erosion, New Orleans was unprepared for—and the levees would not stand—a large Category 4 or 5 hurricane, and yet nothing was done about it (Carter 2005); that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ estimate of $2.5 billion to upgrade the levees against a Category 5 hurricane was ignored, and lesser amounts were spent on special interest projects (Carter 2005); that the poor preparation to mitigate the disaster or its severe impacts was a major cause of the catastrophic result, and this was evidenced during the 2004–05 simulations, with major problems of evacuation task that never got corrected (Glasser and Grunwald 2005); and that despite several days of warnings, local and state government leaders failed to evacuate the local population, most of whom were poor and stranded, and when they did evacuate just before landfall, it was either too late or the poor mobilization activities hampered the task, with most transportation facilities useless under the water.¶ Leadership failure was also evident at the federal level: Despite requests by Louisiana governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco for President Bush to declare a state of emergency under the provisions of the National Response Plan, which gives the president the authority to bypass state and local governments in catastrophic situations, that power was “not used during Katrina” (Wise, 2006, 305). The federal government leadership waited five days after landfall to take coordinated action by putting the federal military and Coast Guard on assignment, far too late and a glaring failure of crisis leadership. FEMA and its director, Michael Brown, failed miserably at coordinating a multi-institutional network of organizations and volunteers during the response process. Appointed on a patronage basis, the FEMA director had no experience or specialized expertise in crisis or emergency management, and he was more interested in his media images than in responding to the crisis (Schneider 2005). Volunteer forces from across the country were ordered by Brown to take a two-day pre-response training in Atlanta instead of taking them into the field, where their assistance was desperately needed. There was also lack of central command structure to provide leadership and to coordinate state and local efforts, with hundreds of network organizations and volunteers unable to work together in a flexible and collaborative way. The Superdome and convention center became death traps for tens of thousands of people, with the local homeland security officials and Brown either claiming not to know about it, despite published communications to the contrary, or failing to provide victims there with help (Cooper 2006). And there was the total communications failure among the police and other government agencies—a total system collapse resulting in complete chaos and costly misunderstandings, a crisis situation that no one was trained or prepared to cope with (Baum 2006).¶ Finally, there was a total intergovernmental management failure: This failure was at the local, state, and federal levels, in addition to horizontal coordination failures in coordinating nongovernmental, nonprofit, and volunteer organization networks present on the scene; in fact, coordination and leadership constituted the biggest failures during Katrina crisis mismanagement (Brennan and Koven, forthcoming; Wise 2006). Socially and politically, Karl Marx is an apt figure to include here, as what happened constituted his philosophy made reality. He would have admonished the ruling-class bourgeoisie at all levels of government for its failure to manage a crisis that did not touch that class and only affected the working-class poor. One can hear his voice claiming that the image of a global war on terrorism was more important for the national governing elite than an act of caring for the working-class citizens trapped in the disaster—hence the fallacy of bourgeois democracy in capitalism. The stakeholders were poor, black, and underclass, and they had no power to influence the governing elites. Watching the drama on television screens across the globe, international observers could and did easily agree with Marx’s assessment of the situation during and after the Katrina crisis.

#### Status quo disaster response destroys the governments reputation – reverse causal

Gaines-Ross 12 (Dr. Leslie Gaines-Ross is a chief reputation strategist and leads public relations firm Weber Shandwick’s global reputation consulting services and proprietary thought leadership development. Dr. Gaines-Ross is also the author of two books, CEO Capital: A Guide to Building CEO Reputation and Company Success (2003) and Corporate Reputation: 12 Steps to Safeguarding and Recovering Reputation (2008). 2012. “Reputation Matters” <http://www.europeanbusinessreview.com/?p=356>)//KDUB

A Tipping Point On August 29, 2005, America suffered its biggest disaster since September 11, 2001. Hurricane Katrina hit the north-central Gulf Coast of the United States at 6:10 a.m. with a particularly catastrophic blow to New Orleans. Levees were soon breached, and the South would never be the same. Thousands of homes were destroyed, leaving tens of thousands of people instantly homeless. As the waters overwhelmed coastal communities, television stations broadcasted dramatic, heart-wrenching images-citizens stranded on roofs waving in desperation to search helicopters, living rooms filled with shattered remains of what were once their homes, and families standing on highways searching for missing loved ones. Distressing media coverage continued day in and day out, for weeks, and then for months. Even after the waters had long since receded, personal, emotional stories continued to make news. Media accounts of unredeemable flood insurance, undelivered trailers for the homeless, and mounting tales of emotional and physical distress seemed to be never ending. The government response at city, state, and federal levels was considered grossly inadequate from the start. Evacuation before and after the hurricane hit was poorly planned and sluggish. Little thought was given to the special needs of the infirm and helpless. Some policemen failed to show up for work. Corpses floated unclaimed amidst the debris in the Lower Ninth Ward. As evacuees squeezed into the Superdome and reports of looting increased at an alarming rate, then U.S. President George W. Bush miscalculated the urgency of the crisis and remained vacationing at his Texas ranch. Several days later, the president visited the suffering port city in a flyover on Air Force One. At an impromptu press conference at the New Orleans airport runway after the flyover, the president praised the head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Michael Brown. However, Brown would ultimately be the target of more criticism in the coming months than perhaps anyone else involved in Katrina’s aftermath. Only as it became increasingly clear that FEMA was unable to provide adequate transportation, food, and shelter did President Bush fire Brown and replace him with an experienced emergency disaster relief admiral. Three years later, the hard-hit Gulf Coast is still getting back on its feet. Although after-effects of Katrina continue to linger, signs of progress are now visible. Permits and licenses for New Orleans vendors for the 2007 Mardi Gras were up 310 percent from 2006. A Kaiser Family Foundation study based on New Orleans residents found that some progress was being made in restoring basic services, reopening schools, launching new businesses, and growing its population. Hurricane Katrina will forever stand as an example of how the American government failed to address one of the country’s most serious modern-day catastrophes. Most every American agreed that assistance for Hurricane Katrina victims was received too little, too late. The majority of Americans (58 percent) in a CBS News poll disapproved of the government’s handling of relief efforts one week after the hurricane hit. Response to Katrina by the federal government, FEMA, and state and local government was regarded by most Americans as poor (77, 70, and 70 percent, respectively). Equally disturbing, Americans believed that the disaster’s response had worsened the already battered overseas image of the United States. Worse still, the American public was left with the impression that the administration’s response to the deadly hurricane reflected a lack of compassion and management ability. Hurricane Katrina had a powerfully negative impact on perceptions of President Bush and his cabinet. The government’s missteps served as a negative tipping point for the Bush administration’s reputation. Its poor handling of the disaster took on epic proportions and was viewed as intrinsic to the core of the administration’s character. Each mistake generated a whole new set of problems. It was not just the administration’s failure to anticipate and react in time to the deadly hurricane, but also the magnitude of this failure that led to a material loss in the president’s and his administration’s reputation. The traditional rally of support for a president during the aftermath of a national emergency such as the September 11 terrorist attacks was nowhere to be found. Coupled with growing dissatisfaction with the war in Iraq, popular support for the administration reached a point of no return. Unfortunately for President Bush, the administration’s past and future actions would thereafter be viewed through the lens of another devastating event. With no appropriate and effective reputation recovery program for the handling of Hurricane Katrina and the continuing violence in Iraq, the November 2006 midterm Senate, House, and gubernatorial elections were all but preordained. Both houses of Congress gained Democratic majorities, thereby demonstrating just how irreparably damaged the administration’s reputation, and that of the political party it represented, had become. This is not to say that local political issues did not play a role in Hurricane Katrina’s devastation. New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin and Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco were both heavily criticized for not ordering New Orleans residents to evacuate early enough. Emergency evacuation plans were implemented less than one day before the hurricane hit, and many people were unable to find safe routes out of the city. Reputation Advantage As the Hurricane Katrina episode shows, reputation matters. Reputation means how positively, or negatively, a company or similar institution is perceived by its key stakeholders-the people or entities that the company or institution relies on for its success. For many for-profit companies, typical stakeholders might include customers, employees, suppliers, or financial analysts. For governments or political entities such as the Bush and now President Obama administrations, stakeholders are, above all, the electorate. Reputation loss can strike any company or group. Unfortunately for many companies that have built great reputations, the much-touted adage ”the bigger they are, the harder they fall” holds true. Stakeholders can lose confidence in even the most highly admired companies that fail them. Although it may take a catastrophe before stakeholders ultimately lose faith in the great branded companies, it does happen, and then the fall from grace can be fast and furious. Hubris has no place in business. All are susceptible to reputation damage. If its reputation is strong, a company in crisis is granted the benefit of the doubt by its stakeholders. They expect companies to do the right thing. Even when inevitable mistakes are committed, stakeholders will afford highly regarded companies an additional opportunity to make amends-an opportunity they are not likely to grant the less regarded. When stakeholders view companies in a positive light, they give companies license to continue to operate and grow. Reputation also contributes directly to a company’s health by providing competitive advantage and differentiation. When stakeholders hold a company in high regard, they generate sales by recommending or buying its products/services. They support its ability to invest and grow by recommending or buying its stock. Stakeholders who hold a company in high esteem are more likely to recommend the company as a good place to work, allowing it to attract, develop, and keep the best employees. Those who admire companies spread positive word-of-mouth across a wide social network. Companies burdened by a tainted reputation have less opportunity to continue business as usual, which further hampers their reputation comeback efforts. Steps that would otherwise be viewed with optimism, or at least equanimity, are viewed with suspicion and doubt. Good reputations do more than raise capital and attract the best talent. Admired companies generate additional sales from loyal customers, attract the right strategic and business partners, assure the public that the company will behave ethically, provide a buffer when problems arise, and sometimes permit companies to charge premium prices. Not to be ignored in this age of regulatory watchdogs is how a positive reputation reduces friction with government officials and legislators. For these reasons and more, there are very real, tangible, ”hard” payoffs to maintaining a good reputation. Weber Shandwick’s Safeguarding ReputationTM research found that a hefty 63 percent of a company’s market value is attributable to reputation, according to global business influencers. Executives in all regions of the world agreed with this high valuation. The average compound shareholder returns of top 10 Fortune Most Admired Companies substantially exceed that of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 companies over five- and one-year periods. A Pennsylvania State University survey also found that reputable companies provided considerably better returns on investment compared to the S&P 500-22 percent versus 16 percent, respectively. Reputation is clearly a quantifiable asset and a proven wealth generator. Good reputation yields ‘’soft” payoffs as well. Companies report that after being named as a ”best company to work for,” resumes pour in. A leading economist estimated that companies included on the Working Mother ”100 Best Companies for Working Mothers” list are worth 3 to 6 percent more than their peers that did not make the list. As Workforce magazine wrote: ”The effort doesn’t always pay off in a high ranking, but a high ranking always pays off in invigorating a company’s reputation among recruits, employees, shareholders, investors, and customers.” Making Fortune’s Best Places to Work list opens wide the recruiting door, as financial services giant Edward Jones found out-job applications went from 7,000 to 400,000 one year after landing on the list. In sharp contrast to the multiple payoffs of good reputation are the real costs of a poor reputation. Least-admired Fortune Most Admired Companies perform considerably worse than the average S & P 500 company. These numbers are not surprising since the reason for a poor reputation may be due to a company’s poor financial performance. But it is also true that a poor reputation may be part of a vicious cycle. Poorly regarded companies have a hard time attracting talent, new business, new partnerships, referrals, customers, and higher pricing compared to highly regarded companies. Companies that suffer from reputation failure have to work harder and longer than companies held in high esteem. As Hurricane Katrina tragically demonstrated, losing reputation is a defining moment for a company, country, institution, or individual. Benjamin Franklin once advised that ”glass, china, and reputation are easily cracked, and never well mended.” Franklin was only partially correct. Yes, reputations are inherently fragile and can tumble without warning overnight. However, the repair process has greatly improved since the eighteenth century. Today, companies can expect to do more than merely patch a tattered reputation back together. Rebuilding a strong reputation is well within the realm of possibility. If the right steps are taken, reputation restoration is likely.

#### That wrecks international credibility and soft power – better disaster response solves

Walt 05 (PhD in political science and professor of International Affairs Stephen Walt, “The world watches as America attempts its restoration,” 10-19-05)//KDUB

The hurricanes that struck America's Gulf coast this autumn were just the beginning of a series of storms — both physical and political — that have done significant damage to the already fragile US image overseas. Seen through the eyes of an international audience, the images of destitute African Americans left to fend for themselves in a wasted New Orleans, of Tom DeLay, Speaker of the House, indicted and of a White House struggling to salvage a Supreme Court nominee and belatedly waking up to the dangers of bird flu, combined to create a powerful impression of insensitivity and ineptitude. Coming on the heels of a war that cast grave doubt on US leadership, these storms and our response threaten America's stature in the world. The US's ability to shape world events rests on three pillars. The first is our economic and military power. The second is others' belief that we are using that power properly. And the third is confidence in US competence. When other countries recognise our strength, support our aims and believe that we know what we are doing, they are more likely to follow our lead. If they doubt our power, our wisdom or our ability to act effectively, US global influence shrinks. Even before the storms, the Iraq war was corroding all three elements of US power. Our armed forces have been weakened and our economy burdened by the costs of occupation, and the abuses at Abu Ghraib jail are a stain on the US's reputation. The new Iraqi constitution will not end the insurgency and the bungled occupation has given others ample reason to doubt the US's ability to handle complex political challenges. At home, the aftermath of the storms has made matters worse in every way, as noted by foreign observers. The Russian newspaper Novosti described the US as "a giant on legs of clay, with one foot planted in New Orleans and the other in Baghdad". Germany's Die Zeit asked: "How can America expect to save the world when it cannot even save itself?" Katrina reinforced foreign perceptions of the US as a wealthy but heartless country where racism is endemic and safety nets are lacking. The China Daily said these events revealed "just how fragile much of America's social fabric is" and Japan's Asahi Shimbun declared that "Katrina showed the world the seriousness and the sorrow of the racial disparities facing the US". Finally, the inept US response to sequential natural disasters reinforced foreign doubts about America's competence. As Austria's Salzburger Nachrichten put it: "How is it possible that the country is so ill prepared?" Thus, as Americans turn to the task of reconstruction, we must do so in a way that restores confidence in our values and our abilities. First, to ensure that the US's overall power remains intact, President George W. Bush must ask the American people to accept the full burden of their national ambitions. If we want to repair the damage the storms wrought, prepare for bird flu, maintain a military that is second to none, have world-class schools and exercise energetic global leadership, it is going to cost money — and it is going to require sacrifices from those who have it, rather than those who do not. Anyone who says differently is either lying or deluded. Rebuilding New Orleans is also an opportunity to demonstrate our commitment to provide for all our citizens. If New Orleans is rebuilt with condominiums for the rich, financed by cutting needed social programmes, or if the reconstruction effort is derailed by corporate greed and congressional pork, the rest of the world will have even more reason to question our values and competence. But if reconstruction is swift and New Orleans becomes a showcase of local opportunity and social justice, we will begin to restore the world's faith in US leadership. In the past, the US was respected because its public institutions could set ambitious goals and then achieve them: recall the New Deal, the Manhattan Project, the Marshall Plan and the moon landing. This stormy season produced tragedies for many but we now have the opportunity to show what America can do. The world is watching; we had better not blow it.

#### Military leadership is inevitable – but credibility is key to solve a plethora of impacts

**Nye 11** [Joseph S. Nye Jr., University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University, God of Soft Power “The Future of Power”, 2011, CMR]

Today, power in the world is distributed in a pattern that resembles a complex three-dimensional chess game. On the top chessboard, military power is largely unipolar and the United States is likely to remain supreme for some time. But on the middle chessboard, economic power has been multipolar for more than a decade, with the United States, Europe, Japan, and China as the major players, and with others gaining in importance. Europe's economy is larger than America's. The bottom chessboard is the realm of transnational relations that cross borders outside of government control, and it includes nonstate actors as diverse as bankers electronically transferring sums larger than most national budgets at one extreme and terrorists transferring weapons or hackers threatening cybersecurity at the other. This chessboard also includes new transnational challenges such as pandemics and climate change. On this bottom board, power is widely diffused, and it makes no sense to speak here of unipolarity, multipolarity, hegemony, or any other such clichés that political leaders and pundits put in their speeches. Two great power shifts are occurring in this century: a power transition among states and a power diffusion away from all states to nonstate actors. Even in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the giddy pace of technological change continues to drive globalization, but the political effects will be quite different for the world of nation-states and the world of nonstate actors. In interstate politics, the most important factor will be the continuing "return of Asia." In 1750, Asia had more than half of the world population and product. By 1900, after the Industrial Revolution in Europe and America, Asia's share shrank to one-fifth of the world product. By 2050, Asia will be well on its way back to its historical share. The "rise" in the power of China and India may create instability, but it is a problem with precedents, and we can learn from history about how our policies can affect the outcome. A century ago, Britain managed the rise of American power without conflict, but the world's failure to manage the rise of German power led to two devastating world wars. In transnational politics-the bottom chessboard-the Information Revolution is dramatically reducing the costs of computing and communication. Forty years ago, instantaneous global communication was possible but costly, and it was restricted to governments and corporations. Today, this communication is virtually free to anyone with the means to enter an Internet cafe. The barriers to entry into world politics have been lowered, and nonstate actors now crowd the stage. Hackers and cybercriminals cause billions of dollars of damage to governments and businesses. A pandemic spread by birds or travelers on jet aircraft could kill more people than perished in World War l or ll, and climate change could impose enormous costs. This is a new world politics with which we have less experience. The problem for all states in the twenty-first century is that there are more and more things outside the control of even the most powerful states, because of the diffusion of power from states to nonstate actors. Although the United States does well on military measures, there is increasingly more going on in the world that those measures fail to capture. Under the influence of the Information Revolution and globalization, world politics is changing in a way that means Americans cannot achieve all their international goals acting alone. For example, international financial stability is vital to the prosperity of Americans, but the United States **needs the cooperation of others** to ensure it. Global climate change too will affect the quality of life, but the United States cannot manage the problem alone. And in a world where borders are becoming more porous than ever to everything from drugs to infectious diseases to terrorism, nations must mobilize **international coalitions** and build institutions to address shared threats and \_ ln this sense, power becomes a positive-sum game. It is not enough to think in terms of power over others. We must also think in terms of power to accomplish goals that involves power with others." On many transnational issues, empowering others can help us to accomplish our own goals. In this world, networks and connectedness become an important source of relevant power. Contextual intelligence, the ability to understand an evolving environment and capitalize on trends, will become a crucial skill in enabling leaders to convert power resources into successful strategies." We will need contextual intelligence if we are to understand that the problem of American power in the twenty-first century is not one of decline, but of a failure to realize that even the largest country cannot achieve its aims **without the help of others**. That will requirea deeper understanding of power, how it is changing, and how to construct smart power strategies. That will require a more sophisticated narrative than the classical stories of the rise and fall of great powers. America is likely to remain the strongest country of the twenty-hrst century; but that will not mean domination. The ability to get the outcomes we want **will rest** up**on** a new narrative of **smart power**.Americans will need to stop asking questions about who is number one, and entertaining narratives about dominance, and start asking questions about how the various tools of power can be combined into smart strategies for power with rather than merely over other nations. Thinking more clearly about power and stimulating that broader narrative are the purposes of this book. [xvi-xvii]

### 2AC EE Resnik

#### Plan is economic means – promotes trade and investment

State Department (“Science and Technology Cooperation”, http://www.state.gov/e/oes/stc/)

Thirty U.S. S&T Agreements worldwide establish bilateral frameworks to facilitate the exchange of scientific results, provide for protection and allocation of intellectual property rights and benefit sharing, facilitate access for researchers, address taxation issues, and respond to the complex set of issues associated with economic development, domestic security and regional stability. S&T cooperation supports the establishment of science-based industries, encourages investment in national science infrastructure, education and the application of scientific standards, promotes international trade and dialogue on issues of direct import to global security, such as protection of the environment and management of natural resources. S&T collaboration assists USG agencies to establish partnerships with counterpart institutions abroad. These relationships enable them to fulfill their individual responsibilities by providing all parties with access to new resources, materials, information, and research. High priority areas include such areas as agricultural and industrial biotechnology research (including research on microorganisms, plant and animal genetic materials, both aquatic and terrestrial), health sciences, marine research, natural products chemistry, environment and energy research.

#### Counter Interp Engagement requires offering positive incentives

**Haass and O’Sullivan, 2k** - \*Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution AND \*\*a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (Richard and Meghan, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies” Survival,, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf>

The term ‘engagement’ was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about the Reagan administration’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’ towards South Africa. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. Except in the few instances where the US has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably ‘engages’ states and actors all the time simply by interacting with them. To be a meaningful subject of analysis, the term ‘engagement’ must refer to something more specific than a policy of ‘non-isolation’. As used in this article, ‘engagement’ refers to a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, it does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military force: in practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of American engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behaviour of countries with which the US has important disagreements.

#### That means we’re T

Haass and O’Sullivan 2k– American diplomat, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Director of Policy Planning for the Department of State, advisor to Colin Powell, US Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan / former deputy national security advisor on Iraq and Afghanistan, Jeane Kirkpatrick Professor of Practice of International Affairs and senior fellow at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (Richard N. and Meghan L., “f Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies”, Brooking Institute, 2000; < http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf>)//Beddow

Many different types of engagement strategies exist, depending on who is engaged, the kind of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued. Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges, such as where the US extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications in US policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Generally, conditional engagement is geared towards a government; unconditional engagement works with a country’s civil society or private sector in the hopes of promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation. Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans and economic aid. 3 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties such as trade embargoes, investment bans or high tariffs, which have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. Facilitated entry into the economic global arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s global market. Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, the scheduling of summits between leaders – or the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of international military educational training in order both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign military officers. While these areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions, cultural or civil-society engagement entails building people-to-people contacts. Funding non- governmental organisations, facilitating the flow of remittances and promoting the exchange of students, tourists and other non-governmental people between countries are just some of the possible incentives used in the form of engagement.

#### Aff ground – Discussing science diplomacy is key to policy analysis

Cathy Campbell, 2010, President and chief executive officer of CRDF Global - an independent nonprofit organization that promotes international scientific and technical collaboration, “Send in the Scientists: Why Mobilizing America’s Researchers Makes Sense for Diplomacy”  
http://scienceprogress.org/2010/10/send\_scientists/

What is needed for science diplomacy to succeed? First, we must continue to educate the international research community, policymakers, and the public about the importance of science diplomacy. Earlier this year, CRDF Global joined with the Partnership for a Secure America and the American Association for the Advancement of Science to highlight the importance of science diplomacy.

#### Reasonability avoids infinite regress

**CICEP, 13** (The Commission on Innovation, Competitiveness and Economic Prosperity (CICEP) is a working group of the Association of Public and Land-grant Universities (APLU). Through regular workshops and meetings, the Commission works on building tools, resources, and standards of practice that universities can use to make the most effective contributions to innovation and economic growth, and to communicate their value in these areas. Members of CICEP include representatives from APLU institution's offices of: academic affairs; research and graduate administration; public and governmental affairs; business and engineering departments; outreach and economic development; technology transfer; and entrepreneurship programs; <http://www.aplu.org/document.doc?id=4431>) KD

I just javaed the date still camp ev

A university conducts its economic development work in a geographic footprint. Sometimes we refer to this geographic footprint as community or region, or we modify it with words like local, state, national, or international to help clarify the geographic area being served. This document will use the word ‘community’ to define the geographic area being served, recognizing that the service area specified for or assumed by the institution (i.e., the city, county, region, state(s), nation, or world) varies by institution and by the specific program or economic development activity. Similarly, the term “economic engagement” has various interpretations across the higher education community. Its use in this tool is meant to help guide campus conversations, not prescribe a particular view of how an institution defines its contributions to its community.

### 2ac cir

#### The plan’s popular

**DeWeerd, 1** – writer in seatte, cites Nick Smith, a republican rep from MI, (Sarah, “Embargoing Science: US Policy toward Cuba and Scientific Collaboration” 2001)ahayes

These relatively streamlined procedures have been in place since 1999, when the Clinton administration announced a new policy to expand people-to-people contacts-such as scientific exchanges-between the United States and Cuba. Scientific collaboration between the two countries continues to enjoy broad bipartisan support in Washington. Rep. Nick Smith (R-MI), who visited Cuba in April as part of a delegation organized by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, says that scientific collaboration is "one area that's reasonable" for contact with Cuba. "There are some things we can learn from them, and certainly many things they can learn from the scientific effort in this country."

#### Won’t pass

Kasperowicz, 12/4

[Pete, 7:39 pm, Capitol Hill Publishing Corp, “Dem melts down on House floor over immigration,” http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/floor-speeches/192122-dem-melts-down-on-house-floor-over-immigration, 12/5/13, JAZ]

Rep. Jared Polis (D-Colo.) on Wednesday night lost his cool on the House floor over the issue of immigration, after the presiding officer warned another Democrat not to refer to people sitting in the House gallery. [WATCH VIDEO]¶ Democrats were calling for House passage of a comprehensive immigration bill, and Rep. Joe Garcia (D-Fla.) used his remarks to note supporters of such a bill that were sitting in the gallery.¶ When he was done, the presiding officer, Rep. Jackie Walorski (R-Ind.) issued the standard warning that members are not supposed to refer to people in the gallery. That's when Polis confronted Walorski.¶ "Madame Speaker, the gentle people in the gallery… would not have to be in the gallery… advocating if this House simply took up the bill," he began. "Do you think they want to be spending their time here, Madame Speaker? Is that what you think?"¶ "And you're saying we're addressing them, and that's what you're upset about Madame Speaker?" he continued, moving into a full scream. "I want you, Madame Speaker, to address the reason that they are here! They are here because our government is tearing apart their families, Madame Speaker!"¶ Walorski interrupted by saying all members are instructed not to address people in the gallery, but Polis shot back: "I want the Speaker to understand that the Speaker is obstructing H.R. 15 from coming to the floor!"¶ H.R. 15 is the House Democratic counterpart to the Senate's immigration bill, which House GOP leaders have said they would not take up.¶ Walorski tried to interrupt by saying Polis was out of order, as Polis continued to bark, "Will the Speaker understand that? Will the Speaker understand that?"¶ Polis quickly calmed down and continued his remarks about the need for an immigration bill. He said until a bill passes, people will continue to sit in the gallery — "perhaps against your wishes," he said to Walorski.

#### Forcing controversial fights key to Obama’s agenda

Dickerson 13 (John, Slate, Go for the Throat!, 1/18 www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/politics/2013/01/barack\_obama\_s\_second\_inaugural\_address\_the\_president\_should\_declare\_war.single.html)

On Monday, President Obama will preside over the grand reopening of his administration. It would be altogether fitting if he stepped to the microphone, looked down the mall, and let out a sigh: so many people expecting so much from a government that appears capable of so little. A second inaugural suggests new beginnings, but this one is being bookended by dead-end debates. Gridlock over the fiscal cliff preceded it and gridlock over the debt limit, sequester, and budget will follow. After the election, the same people are in power in all the branches of government and they don't get along. There's no indication that the president's clashes with House Republicans will end soon. Inaugural speeches are supposed to be huge and stirring. Presidents haul our heroes onstage, from George Washington to Martin Luther King Jr. George W. Bush brought the Liberty Bell. They use history to make greatness and achievements seem like something you can just take down from the shelf. Americans are not stuck in the rut of the day. But this might be too much for Obama’s second inaugural address: After the last four years, how do you call the nation and its elected representatives to common action while standing on the steps of a building where collective action goes to die? That bipartisan bag of tricks has been tried and it didn’t work. People don’t believe it. Congress' approval rating is 14 percent, the lowest in history. In a December Gallup poll, 77 percent of those asked said the way Washington works is doing “serious harm” to the country. The challenge for President Obama’s speech is the challenge of his second term: how to be great when the environment stinks. Enhancing the president’s legacy requires something more than simply the clever application of predictable stratagems. Washington’s partisan rancor, the size of the problems facing government, and the limited amount of time before Obama is a lame duck all point to a single conclusion: The president who came into office speaking in lofty terms about bipartisanship and cooperation can only cement his legacy if he destroys the GOP. If he wants to transform American politics, he must go for the throat. President Obama could, of course, resign himself to tending to the achievements of his first term. He'd make sure health care reform is implemented, nurse the economy back to health, and put the military on a new footing after two wars. But he's more ambitious than that. He ran for president as a one-term senator with no executive experience. In his first term, he pushed for the biggest overhaul of health care possible because, as he told his aides, he wanted to make history. He may already have made it. There's no question that he is already a president of consequence. But there's no sign he's content to ride out the second half of the game in the Barcalounger. He is approaching gun control, climate change, and immigration with wide and excited eyes. He's not going for caretaker. How should the president proceed then, if he wants to be bold? The Barack Obama of the first administration might have approached the task by finding some Republicans to deal with and then start agreeing to some of their demands in hope that he would win some of their votes. It's the traditional approach. Perhaps he could add a good deal more schmoozing with lawmakers, too. That's the old way. He has abandoned that. He doesn't think it will work and he doesn't have the time. As Obama explained in his last press conference, he thinks the Republicans are dead set on opposing him. They cannot be unchained by schmoozing. Even if Obama were wrong about Republican intransigence, other constraints will limit the chance for cooperation. Republican lawmakers worried about primary challenges in 2014 are not going to be willing partners. He probably has at most 18 months before people start dropping the lame-duck label in close proximity to his name. Obama’s only remaining option is to pulverize. Whether he succeeds in passing legislation or not, given his ambitions, his goal should be to delegitimize his opponents. Through a series of clarifying fights over controversial issues, he can force Republicans to either side with their coalition's most extreme elements or cause a rift in the party that will leave it, at least temporarily, in disarray.

#### Piecemeal passage solves

Foley 10/29 (Elise Foley, reporter; Huffington Post; 10/29/2013; “Conservatives Pushing Immigration Reform Say Piecemeal Approach Gains Steam”; <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/29/immigration-reform-conservatives_n_4175758.html>; KDUB)

House Republican leaders have rejected a comprehensive approach, saying they will instead vote on individual pieces of legislation. Though some immigration-related bills have been approved by House committees, they haven't gone to the floor for a vote.¶ Other bills are being drafted, but haven't been released, such as one led by Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-Va.) and Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.) to give legal status to undocumented young people. Rep. Darrell Issa (R-Calif.) reportedly plans to introduce a bill that would allow undocumented immigrants to stay in the U.S. temporarily while they seek long-term solutions. It's unclear if such a measure could win support, given Republican opposition to so-called "amnesty" and Democratic reluctance to support something without a path to citizenship.¶ House Democrats have introduced a bill of their own and won support from nearly all of their own caucus and two Republicans: Reps. Jeff Denham (R-Calif.) and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.). The Democratic bill is a combination of the Senate-passed comprehensive reform legislation -- which includes a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants -- and a separate border security measure approved by the House Homeland Security Committee. The House Democrat-led bill won't get a vote, according to GOP leadership.¶ Based on what he heard from House members, Bailey said he doesn't think a path to citizenship "is going to happen." But Democrats, he said, may be realizing they're better off taking what they can get now and pushing for expanded reforms later.

#### XO solves

The Hill 2-16 (“Dems: Obama can act unilaterally on immigration reform”

http://thehill.com/blogs/regwatch/administration/283583-dems-recognize-that-obama-can-act-unilaterally-on-immigration-reform#ixzz2LEvg4R5R)

President Obama can – and will – take steps on immigration reform in the event Congress doesn't reach a comprehensive deal this year, according to several House Democratic leaders. While the Democrats are hoping Congress will preclude any executive action by enacting reforms legislatively, they say the administration has the tools to move unilaterally if the bipartisan talks on Capitol Hill break down. Furthermore, they say, Obama stands poised to use them. "I don't think the president will be hands off on immigration for any moment in time," Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-Calif.), the head of the House Democratic Caucus, told reporters this week. "He's ready to move forward if we're not." Rep. Joseph Crowley (N.Y.), vice chairman of the Democratic Caucus, echoed that message, saying Obama is "not just beating the drum," for immigration reform, "he's actually the drum major." "There are limitations as to what he can do with executive order," Crowley said Wednesday, "but he did say that if Congress continued to fail to act that he would take steps and measures to enact common-sense executive orders to move this country forward." Rep. Raul Grijalva (D-Ariz.), who heads the Congressional Progressive Caucus, said there are "plenty" of executive steps Obama could take if Congress fails to pass a reform package. "The huge one," Grijalva said, is "the waiving of deportation" in order to keep families together. "Four million of the undocumented [immigrants] are people who overstayed their visas to stay with family," he said Friday. "So that would be, I think, an area in which … there's a great deal of executive authority that he could deal with." The administration could also waive visa caps, Grijalva said, to ensure that industries like agriculture have ample access to low-skilled labor. "Everybody's for getting the smart and the talented in, but there's also a labor flow issue," he said. To be sure, Obama and congressional Democrats would prefer the reforms to come through Congress – both because that route would solidify the changes into law and because it would require bipartisan buy-in. Still, House Republicans have been loath to accept one of the central elements of Obama's strategy: A pathway to citizenship for the estimated 11-12 million undocumented people currently living in the country – a move which many conservatives deem "amnesty." Indeed, when the House Judiciary Committee met earlier this month on immigration reform, much of the discussion focused on whether there is some middle ground between citizenship and mass deportation. “If we can find a solution that is … short of a pathway to citizenship, but better than just kicking 12 million people out, why is that not a good solution?” Rep. Raul Labrador (R-Idaho) asked during the hearing. Obama on Tuesday spent a good portion of his State of the Union address urging Congress to send him a comprehensive immigration reform bill this year. Central to that package, he said, should be provisions for "strong border security," for "establishing a responsible pathway to earned citizenship" and for "fixing the legal immigration system to cut waiting periods and attract the highly-skilled entrepreneurs and engineers that will help create jobs and grow our economy." "We know what needs to be done," Obama said. "So let’s get this done." Becerra said he and other immigration reformers have had two meetings with the White House on immigration this month, one with the executive team working on the issue and, more recently, with Obama himself. Becerra said administration officials "essentially" know what reforms they want – "and they have communicated that to both House and Senate members, bipartisanly" – but they also want Congress to take the lead. "They're giving Congress a chance to work its will to move this," Becerra said. "But … I don't think he's going to wait too long. "If you were to ask him would he be prepared to submit a bill if Congress isn't ready … he would tell you, I have no doubt, 'I can do it in a heartbeat,'" Becerra added. "The president will move forward where he can if Congress doesn't act."

### 2ac consult

#### Consult kills credibility which is key to relations

Krauthammer 2002 (CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER, winner of the 1987 Pulitzer Prize for distinguished commentary, writes a nationally syndicated editorial page column for the Washington Post Writers Group. Educated at McGill University, Oxford University and Harvard University, where he received an M.D. in 1975, Dr. Krauthammer practiced medicine for three years as a resident and then chief resi­dent in psychiatry at Massachusetts General Hospital before moving to Washington, D.C., and launching his journalism career in 1978. Today, in addition to his weekly column that runs in over 100 newspa­pers, he writes regular essays for Time magazine, contributes to several others including the Weekly standard, the New Republic and the National Interest, and appears regularly as an analyst on the Fox News Channel. Dr. Krauthammer also serves as a member of President Bush's Council on Bioethics. “American Unilateralism”, <http://www.byui.edu/onlinelearning/courses/hum/202/American%20Unilateralism.htm>)

So much for the moral argument that under­lies multilateralism. What are the practical arguments? There is a school of realists who agree that liberal internationalism is nonsense, but who argue plausibly that we need international or allied support, regardless. One of their arguments is that if a power consistently shares rulemaking with others, it is more likely to get aid and assistance from them. I have my doubts. The U.S. made an extraordinary effort during the Gulf War to get U.N. support, share decision-making and assemble a coalition. As I have pointed out, it even denied itself the fruits of victory in order to honor coalition goals. Did this diminish anti-Americanism in the region? Did it garner support for subsequent Iraq policy - policy dictated by the original acquiescence to that coalition? The attacks of September 11 were planned during the Clinton administration, an administration that made a fetish of consultation and did its utmost to subordi­nate American hegemony. Yet resentments were hardly assuaged, because extremist rage against the U.S. is engendered by the very structure of the international system, not by our management of it. Pragmatic realists value multilateralism in the interest of sharing burdens, on the theory that if you share decision-making, you enlist others in your own hegemony enterprise. As proponents of this school argued recently in Foreign Affairs, “Straining relationships now will lead only to a more challenging policy environment later on.” This is a pure cost-benefit analysis of multilateralism versus unilateralism. If the concern about unilateralism is that American assertiveness be judiciously rationed and that one needs to think long-term, hardly anybody will disagree. One does not go it alone or dictate terms on every issue. There's no need to. On some issues, such as membership in the World Trade Organization, where the long-term benefit both to the U.S. and to the global interest is demonstrable, one willingly constricts sovereignty. Trade agreements are easy calls, however, free trade being perhaps the only mathematically provable political good. Other agreements require great skepticism. The Kyoto Protocol on climate change, for example, would have had a disastrous effect on the American economy, while doing nothing for the global environment. Increased emissions from China, India and other third-world countries which are exempt from its provisions clearly would have overwhelmed and made up for whatever American cuts would have occurred. Kyoto was therefore rightly rejected by the Bush administration. It failed on its merits, but it was pushed very hard nonetheless, because the rest of the world supported it. The same case was made during the Clinton administration for chemical and biological weapons treaties, which they negotiated assiduously under the logic of, “Sure, they're useless or worse, but why not give in, in order to build good will for future needs?” The problem is that appeasing multilateralism does not assuage it; appeasement only legitimizes it. Repeated acquiescence on provisions that America deems injurious reinforces the notion that legitimacy derives from international consensus. This is not only a moral absurdity. It is injurious to the U.S., because it undermines any future ability of the U.S. to act unilaterally, if necessary. The key point I want to make about the new unilateralism is that we have to be guided by our own independent judgment, both about our own interests and about global interests. This is true especially on questions of national security, war making, and freedom of action in the deployment of power. America should neither defer nor contract out such decision-making, particularly when the concessions involve per­manent structural constrictions, such as those imposed by the International Criminal Court. Should we exercise prudence? Yes. There is no need to act the superpower in East Timor or Bosnia, as there is in Afghanistan or in Iraq. There is no need to act the superpower on steel tariffs, as there is on missile defense. The prudent exercise of power calls for occasional concessions on non-vital issues, if only to maintain some psychological goodwill. There's no need for gratuitous high-handedness or arrogance. We shouldn't, however, delude ourselves as to what psychological goodwill can buy. Countries will cooperate with us first out of their own self­interest, and second out of the need and desire to cultivate good relations with the world's unipolar power. Warm feelings are a distant third. After the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, Yemen did everything it could to stymie the American investigation. It lifted not a finger to suppress terrorism at home, and this was under an American administration that was obsessively multilateralist and accommodating. Yet today, under the most unilateralist American administration in memory, Yemen has decided to assist in the war on terrorism. This was not the result of a sudden attack of Yemeni goodwill, or of a quick re-reading of the Federalist Papers. It was a result of the war in Afghanistan, which concentrated the mind of recalcitrant states on the price of non-cooperation. Coalitions are not made by superpowers going begging hat in hand; they are made by asserting a position and inviting others to join. What even pragmatic realists fail to understand is that unilateralism is the high road to multilateralism. It was when the first President Bush said that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would not stand, and made it clear that he was prepared to act alone if necessary, that he created the Gulf War coalition.

#### US credibility is key to build coalitions which solve every existential risk

Reiffel, ‘5 (Lex, Visiting Fellow at the Global Economy and Development Center of the Brookings Institution, The Brookings Institution, Reaching Out: Americans Serving Overseas, 12-27-2005, www.brookings.edu/views/papers/20051207rieffel.pdf)

I. Introduction: Overseas Service as a Soft Instrument of Power The United States is struggling to define a new role for itself in the post-Cold War world that protects its vital self interests without making the rest of the world uncomfortable. In retrospect, the decade of the 1990s was a cakewalk. Together with its Cold War allies Americans focused on helping the transition countries in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union build functioning democratic political systems and growing market economies. The USA met this immense challenge successfully, by and large, and it gained friends in the process. By contrast, the first five years of the new millennium have been mostly downhill for the USA. The terrorist attacks on 9/11/01 changed the national mood in a matter of hours from gloating to a level of fear unknown since the Depression of the 1930s. They also pushed sympathy for the USA among people in the rest of the world to new heights. However, the feeling of global solidarity quickly dissipated after the military intervention in Iraq by a narrow US-led coalition. A major poll measuring the attitudes of foreigners toward the USA found a sharp shift in opinion in the negative direction between 2002 and 2003, which has only partially recovered since then.1 The devastation of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina at the end of August 2005 was another blow to American self-confidence as well as to its image in the rest of the world. It cracked the veneer of the society reflected in the American movies and TV programs that flood the world. It exposed weaknesses in government institutions that had been promoted for decades as models for other countries. Internal pressure to turn America’s back on the rest of the world is likely to intensify as the country focuses attention on domestic problems such as the growing number of Americans without health insurance, educational performance that is declining relative to other countries, deteriorating infrastructure, and increased dependence on foreign supplies of oil and gas. A more isolationist sentiment would reduce the ability of the USA to use its overwhelming military power to promote peaceful change in the developing countries that hold two-thirds of the world’s population and pose the gravest threats to global stability. Isolationism might heighten the sense of security in the short run, but it would put the USA at the mercy of external forces in the long run. Accordingly, one of the great challenges for the USA today is to build a broad coalition of like-minded nations and a set of international institutions capable of maintaining order and addressing global problems such as nuclear proliferation, epidemics like HIV/AIDS and avian flu, **failed states** like Somalia and Myanmar, and environmental degradation. The costs of acting alone or in small coalitions are now more clearly seen to be unsustainable. The limitations of “hard” instruments of foreign policy have been amply demonstrated in Iraq. Military power can dislodge a tyrant with great efficiency but cannot build stable and prosperous nations. Appropriately, the appointment of Karen Hughes as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs suggests that the Bush Administration is gearing up to rely more on “soft” instruments.2

#### Military leadership is inevitable – but credibility is key to solve transnational problems – terrorism, cybersecurity, disease, climate, war

**Nye 11** [Joseph S. Nye Jr., University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University, God of Soft Power “The Future of Power”, 2011, CMR]

Today, power in the world is distributed in a pattern that resembles a complex three-dimensional chess game. On the top chessboard, military power is largely unipolar and the United States is likely to remain supreme for some time. But on the middle chessboard, economic power has been multipolar for more than a decade, with the United States, Europe, Japan, and China as the major players, and with others gaining in importance. Europe's economy is larger than America's. The bottom chessboard is the realm of transnational relations that cross borders outside of government control, and it includes nonstate actors as diverse as bankers electronically transferring sums larger than most national budgets at one extreme and terrorists transferring weapons or hackers threatening cybersecurity at the other. This chessboard also includes new transnational challenges such as pandemics and climate change. On this bottom board, power is widely diffused, and it makes no sense to speak here of unipolarity, multipolarity, hegemony, or any other such clichés that political leaders and pundits put in their speeches. Two great power shifts are occurring in this century: a power transition among states and a power diffusion away from all states to nonstate actors. Even in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the giddy pace of technological change continues to drive globalization, but the political effects will be quite different for the world of nation-states and the world of nonstate actors. In interstate politics, the most important factor will be the continuing "return of Asia." In 1750, Asia had more than half of the world population and product. By 1900, after the Industrial Revolution in Europe and America, Asia's share shrank to one-fifth of the world product. By 2050, Asia will be well on its way back to its historical share. The "rise" in the power of China and India may create instability, but it is a problem with precedents, and we can learn from history about how our policies can affect the outcome. A century ago, Britain managed the rise of American power without conflict, but the world's failure to manage the rise of German power led to two devastating world wars. In transnational politics-the bottom chessboard-the Information Revolution is dramatically reducing the costs of computing and communication. Forty years ago, instantaneous global communication was possible but costly, and it was restricted to governments and corporations. Today, this communication is virtually free to anyone with the means to enter an Internet cafe. The barriers to entry into world politics have been lowered, and nonstate actors now crowd the stage. Hackers and cybercriminals cause billions of dollars of damage to governments and businesses. A pandemic spread by birds or travelers on jet aircraft could kill more people than perished in World War l or ll, and climate change could impose enormous costs. This is a new world politics with which we have less experience. The problem for all states in the twenty-first century is that there are more and more things outside the control of even the most powerful states, because of the diffusion of power from states to nonstate actors. Although the United States does well on military measures, there is increasingly more going on in the world that those measures fail to capture. Under the influence of the Information Revolution and globalization, world politics is changing in a way that means Americans cannot achieve all their international goals acting alone. For example, international financial stability is vital to the prosperity of Americans, but the United States **needs the cooperation of others** to ensure it. Global climate change too will affect the quality of life, but the United States cannot manage the problem alone. And in a world where borders are becoming more porous than ever to everything from drugs to infectious diseases to terrorism, nations must mobilize **international coalitions** and build institutions to address shared threats and \_ ln this sense, power becomes a positive-sum game. It is not enough to think in terms of power over others. We must also think in terms of power to accomplish goals that involves power with others." On many transnational issues, empowering others can help us to accomplish our own goals. In this world, networks and connectedness become an important source of relevant power. Contextual intelligence, the ability to understand an evolving environment and capitalize on trends, will become a crucial skill in enabling leaders to convert power resources into successful strategies." We will need contextual intelligence if we are to understand that the problem of American power in the twenty-first century is not one of decline, but of a failure to realize that even the largest country cannot achieve its aims **without the help of others**. That will requirea deeper understanding of power, how it is changing, and how to construct smart power strategies. That will require a more sophisticated narrative than the classical stories of the rise and fall of great powers. America is likely to remain the strongest country of the twenty-hrst century; but that will not mean domination. The ability to get the outcomes we want **will rest** up**on** a new narrative of **smart power**.Americans will need to stop asking questions about who is number one, and entertaining narratives about dominance, and start asking questions about how the various tools of power can be combined into smart strategies for power with rather than merely over other nations. Thinking more clearly about power and stimulating that broader narrative are the purposes of this book. [xvi-xvii]

### 2ac bioterror

#### Bio-attack is probable now

Garrett 12 (January 5, 2012, Laurie Garrett is senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations and recipient of the 1996 Pulitzer Prize for her coverage of the Ebola outbreak, “Flu Season” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/05/flu\_season?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full)//KDUB

When flu scientist Ron Fouchier of Erasmus University in Rotterdam announced in September that he had made a highly contagious, supervirulent form of the bird-flu virus, a long chain of political events unfolded, mostly out of the public eye. Fouchier told European virologists at a meeting in Malta that he had created a form of the H5N1 avian flu -- which is naturally extremely dangerous to both birds and mammals, but only contagious via birds -- that was both 60 percent fatal to infected animals and readily transmitted through the air between ferrets, which are used as experimental stand-ins for human beings. The University of Wisconsin's Yoshihiro Kawaoka, one of the world's top influenza experts, then announced hours later that his lab had achieved a similar feat. Given that in some settings H5N1 has killed more than 80 percent of the people that it has infected, presumably as a result of their contact with an ailing bird, Fouchier's announcement set the scientific community and governments worldwide into conniption fits, with visions of pandemics dancing in their heads. Within government circles around the world, the announcement has highlighted a dilemma: How do you balance the universal mandate for scientific openness against the fear that terrorists or rogue states might follow the researchers' work -- using it as catastrophic cookbooks for global influenza contagion? Concern reached such heights that U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a surprise visit to Geneva on Dec. 7, addressing the review summit on biological weapons. No American official of her stature had attended the bioweapons summits in decades, and Clinton's presence stunned observers. Clinton told the Palais des Nations audience that the threat of biological weapons could no longer be ignored because "there are warning signs," including "evidence in Afghanistan that … al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula made a call to arms for -- and I quote -- 'brothers with degrees in microbiology or chemistry to develop a weapon of mass destruction.'" (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is the terrorist group's Yemeni-based affiliate and perhaps its most aggressive arm today, with connections to a number of ambitious plots.) Then, in what has widely been interpreted as an allusion to the superflu experiments, Clinton added, "The nature of the problem is evolving. The advances in science and technology make it possible to both prevent and cure more diseases, but also easier for states and nonstate actors to develop biological weapons. A crude, but effective, terrorist weapon can be made by using a small sample of any number of widely available pathogens, inexpensive equipment, and college-level chemistry and biology. Even as it becomes easier to develop these weapons, it remains extremely difficult … to detect them, because almost any biological research can serve dual purposes. The same equipment and technical knowledge used for legitimate research to save lives can also be used to manufacture deadly diseases." By the end of 2011, few governments or scientific committees were satisfied with the actions that had been taken to date to limit publication of the methods Fouchier and Kawaoka deployed, and most were frankly frightened. The Fouchier episode laid bare the emptiness of biological-weapons prevention programs on the global, national, and local levels. Along with several older studies that are now garnering fresh attention, it has revealed that the political world is completely unprepared for the synthetic-biology revolution.

#### Extinction

Steinbrenner, Brookings Institute Senior Fellow, 97

(John Steinbrenner, Senior Fellow – Brookings, Foreign Policy, 12-22-1997, Lexis, 6-31-13)

**Although human pathogens are often lumped with nuclear explosives** and lethal chemicals as potential weapons of mass destruction, **there is an obvious, fundamentally important difference: Pathogens are alive**, weapons are not. **Nuclear and chemical weapons do not reproduce themselves and do not independently engage in adaptive behavior; pathogens do both** of these things. That deceptively simple observation has immense implications. **The use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event**. Most of the damage occurs immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may be, decay rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable manner. **Even before a nuclear warhead is detonated**, for instance**, it is possible to estimate the extent of the subsequent damage** and the likely level of radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an essential component for tactical military planning. **The use of a pathogen**, by contrast, **is an extended process whose scope and timing cannot be precisely controlled**. For most potential biological agents, the predominant drawback is that they would not act swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective weapon. **But for a few pathogens - ones** **most likely to have a decisive effect and therefore the ones most likely to be contemplated for deliberately hostile use - the risk runs in the other direction. A lethal pathogen that could efficiently spread from one victim to another would be capable of initiating an intensifying cascade of disease that might ultimately threaten the entire world population**. **The 1918 influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential for a global contagion** of this sort **but not necessarily its outer limit.**

### 2ac coloniality top

**Coloniality is inevitable and the attempts to singularize modernity discretely – the affirmative is a productive engagement to break down the negative effects of colonialism and the alternative reentrenches exclusion**

Pheng **Cheah** is Associate Professor of Rhetoric. **2006** http://townsendcenter.berkeley.edu/publications/limits-thinking-decolonial-strategies

Mignolo announces nothing less than a radical critique of modernity that seeks to situate it within what he calls “coloniality.” By the term “coloniality,” he seems to designate something that is much wider than the related historical projects of imperialism and colonialism. It refers to an epochal condition and an epistemological frame that binds these historical projects to modernity in an inseverable manner. Mignolo suggests that a totalitarian idea of totality is a key feature of modernity. Modernity conserves itself as a totality by positing an “outside” of Europe and the North Atlantic that is excluded from modernity through a discourse of racism. The rhetoric of modernity therefore leads inevitably to a logic of coloniality. This frame also engulfs the present and underwrites much radical thought that occurs under the rubric of “emancipation,” including Marx’s idea of a proletarian revolution as well as Toni Negri and Michael Hardt’s idea of the multitude, but also varieties of post-structuralism, postmodernism, and postcolonial theory. What Mignolo counterposes to this entire formation is a project of liberation that involves delinking from coloniality and modernity. He calls this project “decoloniality” and it involves generalizing the experiences of decolonization and anticolonial struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as well as the experiences of the damnés, the wretched of the earth, into a new epistemic frame. The project of decoloniality therefore involves a double gesture: first, the re-embodiment and relocation of thought in order to unmask the limited situation of modern knowledges and their link to coloniality, and second, an-other thinking that calls for plurality and intercultural dialogue, especially within the South. Mignolo’s manifesto is syncretically rich and wide-ranging in its scope and polemical reach. It traverses the discourses of philosophy and various social sciences and the humanities and also draws on radical activist discourse. But more importantly, it is so uplifting in its spirit of demagogic optimism that it is difficult to disagree with most of its exhortations. I would like to begin by focusing on a rhetorical gesture that runs throughout Professor Mignolo’s text. The single word title of the text, “Delinking,” is identical to a book written by the Marxist political economist, Samir Amin (Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World). Yet, Mignolo repeatedly distances his project from that of Amin (and all dependency theory) for at least two reasons. First, Amin only conceived of political and economic delinking, i.e. delinking in the sphere of political economy. He did not understand the urgent need for delinking at the epistemic level, the more fundamental level of thought. Hence, Amin’s project fails to break with the modern concept of totality. Second, and as a consequence of this failure to engage in epistemic delinking, Amin remains caught up in the modern disembodied universalistic project of Marxism. It is thus not really a radical delinking but only “radical emancipation within the rhetoric of modernity and the logic of coloniality.” A different polemical critique is directed at the postcolonial theory of Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, and Homi Bhabha. Postcolonial theory may engage in the epistemic questioning of the concept of totality and may also be critical of modernity. However, since it is grounded on the poststructuralism of Foucault, Lacan, and Derrida, it is still “a project of scholarly transformation within the academy” that remains internal to Europe. Unlike decoloniality, the postcolonial is not attuned to what Mignolo calls “other sources:” the critique and activism (“radical political and epistemological shifts”) of various important figures from Asia, Africa, and Latin America such as Gandhi, Cabral, and Fanon. What unites these two polemical gestures is a sense of the primacy of the epistemic in undoing coloniality. However, Mignolo also has a rather unusual understanding of the epistemic that gives it a special affinity to the damnés. On the one hand, a Marxist political-economic approach to delinking is not conceptual enough since it does not broach the fundamental level of thought. It fails to take over “epistemic power.” On the other hand, however, the intensely epistemic reflections of postcolonial theory remain too abstract and rarefied. “The epistemic locations for delinking,” Mignolo believes, “come from the emergence of the geo- and body-politics of knowledge.” In other words, the epistemic has to have a material dimension. But its materiality is not that of the structures of political economy but of the corporeal experiences of those who have been excluded from the production of knowledge by modernity. What I would like to focus on are not the details of Mignolo’s polemical criticisms, but instead the account of power implied by his understanding of the epistemic. What is put forward here is a logocentrism of power. For Mignolo, power, whether it is oppressive or liberatory, has a logic that we can chart, decipher, and ultimately correct. There is a logic of coloniality and it has to be counteracted by a logic of decoloniality. Delinking from the colonial matrix of power does not seek to reject modernity and its conceptual system because this is so widespread. It requires instead, Mignolo believes, “border thinking or border epistemology in the precise sense that the Western foundation of modernity and of knowledge is, on the one hand, unavoidable and, on the other, highly limited and dangerous.” Coloniality is ultimately always a failure of thought, of knowledge, or of a logic that is dangerous. This is also, in many respects, a top-down theory of power, where power is repressive and emanates from a totalizing source according to a logical design or plan. Events and occurrences up to and including the present are grounded in a logic that is dangerous or mistaken and that needs to be corrected by the intervention of other logics that emanate from the various subjects that have been excluded and subjugated by coloniality. It is at this point that the question of the re-embodiment and relocation of knowledge becomes crucial. For Mignolo admits that the project of epistemic delinking may sound “somewhat messianic.” I would say perhaps “idealistic” in the colloquial sense. However, he immediately asserts that it is “an orientation that in the first decade of the 21st century has shown its potential and its viability,” for example, in the various World Social Forums. Many historical examples of liberation are also adduced: the Amaru rising in Peru, the Hatian revolution and decolonization in Asia and Africa. As opposed to the false other that modernity has invented as its exteriority or outside, the outside that it has excluded in order to create itself, these truly other voices introduce “other cosmologies into the dominance and hegemony of Western cosmological variations within the same rhetoric of modernity and logic of coloniality.” The logic of decoloniality was then explicitly thematized in the thought of radical Arabo-Islamic thinkers in the 1960s and 1970s such as Ayatollah Khomeini and by philosophy of liberation in Latin America and by first-nation intellectuals. The stress is placed on the importance of “other” languages that have been negated by colonial modernity. The argument here is similar to the epistemology of location in feminist theory and critical race theory (for example, Luce Irigaray). I would like to end by posing two questions concerning the two main limbs of Mignolo’s argument: the primacy of the epistemic and the urgency of embodying and locating knowledge. First, does power in fact operate according to a logic and from a totalizing source that represses and subjugates those it has excluded in contemporary globalization? Is the link between modernity and coloniality primarily epistemic in character? It is interesting to note from this perspective that when Mignolo attempts to establish the epistemic link between modernity and coloniality, he relies on a historical biography and the fiction of a collective will or intention to dominate and colonize: “The rhetoric of modernity has been predominantly put forward by European men of letters, philosophers, intellectuals, officers of the state. The modern/colonial power differential was, of course, structured at all levels (economic, political, epistemological, militarily), but it was at the epistemological level that the rhetoric of modernity gained currency. If we had time to go into the biography of the main voices that conceived ‘modernity’ as the series of historical events….all of them would originate in one of the six European countries leading the Renaissance, the colonial expansion and capitalist formation, and the European Enlightenment.” In this view, development in the postcolonial world would be an ideological ruse of the logic of coloniality that forecloses the voices of marginalized peoples. Yet, one might argue that exploitative development in contemporary globalization operates not by racist techniques of exclusion and marginalization, but precisely by including, integrating, and assimilating every being into the circuit of the international division of labor. This is done by transforming them into reserve labor power through techniques of what Foucault called biopower. But we would here need to understand biopower in a different way from Mignolo’s understanding of biopolitics or body-politics, a difference that he also acknowledges. This different understanding of power as productive as opposed to repressive seems especially important in contemporary globalization where the flows of transnational capital fabricate the economic well-being of nation-states and their individual citizens. First, at the macrological level of global political economy, states undertake aggressive policy initiatives to open up their markets and attract foreign capital. Second, at the level of the biopolitical production of the individual and the population, techniques of discipline and government craft the bodies of individuals as bodies capable of work and create their needs and interests as members of a population. Third, at the level of social reproduction, global mass consumer culture also leads to the proliferation of sophisticated consumer needs and desires. These processes constitute the conditions of possibility of the political and economic self-determination and sovereignty of collective subjects and the self-mastery and security of individual subjects. In other words, the current state of power relations is an effect of multiple processes that are dynamic, heterogeneous, and unstable, processes that cannot be reduced to a single logic of coloniality, although the latter can emerge as their effect. What is the relation between these two different conceptions of biopolitics? Do they contradict each other? How would the wretched of the earth fit into this alternative cartography of global power that I have sketched? This leads me to my second question. The focus on re-embodying knowledges and knowledges in other languages can very easily lead to an idealization of bodily experiences and the concrete and the linguistic other. First, do concrete corporeal experiences offer a genuinely other perspective if the concrete bodily needs of individuals are crafted by the techniques of biopower as they are incorporated into the international division of labor? Second, indigenous languages are not inherently egalitarian or liberating just because they are non-European. Non-European languages can have hierarchical, conservative, or reactionary forms of address. Third, how are we to account for the startling similarity between Mignolo’s account of pluriversality and intercultural communication and the kind of cultural pluralism espoused by UNESCO? Here, one should also note the importance of language learning and multiculturalism to the operations of multinational capital. These are all forms of bio-power in the Foucauldian sense. How does one distinguish this from Mignolo’s sense of bio- or body-politics? The problem might well be that we cannot do so. One would need to look at the true heterogeneity of the outside and the complex and multifarious technologies that fabricate these various outsides, not just at the level of a racist rhetoric of exclusion, but at the most concrete level of the production of the bodily needs and interests of subjects claiming alterity.

Perm – Multiple Modernities

Perm: embrace plan in context of alternative modernities and decolonization of knowledge—Their either-or is a false dichotomy – can seek alternative modernities that aren’t eurocentric

**Grossberg** (Distinguished Professor of Communication Studies and Cultural Studies, and Adjunct Distinguished Professor of American Studies, Anthropology, and Geography at the University of North Carolina) **10**

(Lawrence, Cultural Studies in the Future Tense, pg. 264) //DDI13

The M/C project, focused on the possibility of radical alterity, seeks to find "an other way of thinking ... [and] talking about 'worlds and knowledges otherwise’ (Escobar 2007, 179). They too agree that what I have called the alternative modernities model, “in the last instance . . . end[s] up being a reflection of a euro-centered social order, under the assumption that modernity is now everywhere" (183). There is, however, fundamental conceptual disagreement that separates our projects without, I hope, closing off the conversation. They assume that there is no modernity without coloniality. Or, in slightly different terms, “colonialism and the making of the capitalist world system [is] constitutive of modernity" (183). That is, they equate modernity with euro-modernity, and this guarantees that they see their project not as looking for other modernities, but, rather for alternatives to modernity. As I have said previously, I do not disagree that some of the struggles over modernity in the world today are actually struggles against any moder- nity, propelled by a desire to find alternatives to modernity, and that such struggles have to be supported on their own terms, but I do not think these are the only two choices. Additionally, I do agree that the possibility of other modernities, or for that matter, of alternatives to modernity, will require a decolonization of knowledge itself

Alternative and multiple modernities good—offers a more nuanced understand than is captured by their alt

**Grossberg** (Distinguished Professor of Communication Studies and Cultural Studies, and Adjunct Distinguished Professor of American Studies, Anthropology, and Geography at the University of North Carolina) **10**

(Lawrence, Cultural Studies in the Future Tense, pg. 267-8) //DDI13

The question is not when or where modernity belongs, but what it is to belong to modernity. I am not concerned with the contradictions within modernity, but with the possibilities of contradictions among modernities. What would it mean to see modernity as multiple, to think that there are always radically other modernities? It would mean refusing to assume a single narrative of modernity, or even a fractured linear narrative through which modernity moves, whether smoothly or rupturally, in a series of states. It is not a matter of variations, however great, around a set of themes, nor a continuing process of the hybridization of some originary formation. We must "unlearn to think of history as a developmental process in which that which is possible becomes actual ... to learn to think the present---the now that we inhabit as we speak---as irreducibly not one" (Chakrabarty 2000, 249). We must ask, with Gilroy (2ooo~ 56-57), ''in what sense does modernity belong to a closed entity, a geo-body' named Europe?" We must wonder whether C. L. R. James (1989) was right to think that modernity was invented in the "periphery'" of the world system, in the Caribbean. This is to think "modernity elsewhere" (Gilroy zooo~ 76) and, I might add, "else when"; it is to offer "an altogether different, a-centered understanding of European history'' (80).

### AT: K Eurocentrism – AT: Postcolonialism

Fw

**Perm do the plan and all non-mutually parts of the alternative**

**Turn—rejecting reform of institutions of domination makes the entire postcolonial project self-defeating**

**Dirlik 98** – Prof Social Science, History and Anthropology, U Oregon (Arif, The Postcolonial Aura, p ix, AG)

Postcolonial criticism has quickly spent its critical power, however, as its questioning of totalizing solutions has turned into exclusion from criticism of the historical and the structural contexts for the local, without reference to which criticism itself is deprived of critical self-consciousness and, as it celebrates itself, knowingly or unknowingly also **celebrates the conditions that produced it**. Whether postcolonial criticism has been appropriated by those who did not share its initial critical intentions is a moot question, as its methodological denial of structures and its methodological individualism has facilitated such appropriation. Rather than a critique of earlier radicalisms from the inside as initially intended, postcolonialism in its unfolding has turned into a repudiation of the possibility of radical challenges to the existing system of social and political relations. Its preoccupation with local encounters and the politics of identity rules out a thoroughgoing critique of the structures of capitalism, or of other structurally shaped modes of exploitation and oppression, while also legitimizing arguments against collective identities that are necessary to struggles against domination and hegemony.

**Focusing on colonial reps undermines the possibility of solving the root causes of their critique—this is an impact turn to their framework that only the perm can solve**

**Goss** **96** – Aboriginal Resource and Research Centre, New South Wales (Jasper, Postcolonialism, Third World Quarterly 17:2)

In some cases postcolonial theory has contributed to formulating new sets of ideas, but until there is a greater incorporation of the `material’ (whether real or hybrid) as a social force affected by and affecting discourses, rather than simply reducing all forms to textual discourses, much postcolonialism is doomed to an eternal present; a vicious circle that tells us `how’ something is, but contains deeply contradictory strategies of change since all dominating referents are self-determined. Perhaps it is better not simply to seek an either/or position in postcolonialism, but rather to work for projects of decolonisation that include self-reflexivity not based solely on discursive terms, but which occur with an acknowledgment that while, for example, colonialism can be a discursive form, discursive forms are also influenced by classes, genders and ethnicities, which despite their heterogeneous constructions and histories can still have force as structures and institutions.

**Postcolonialism falls into the same trap of representing others**

**Majid 1** (Anouar, Provincial Acts, http://65.107.211.206/post/poldiscourse/casablanca/majid1.html)

As established and practised in the Anglo-American academy, postcolonial theory has been largely oblivious to non-western articulations of self and identity, and has thus tended to interpellate the non-western cultures it seeks to foreground and defend into a solidly Eurocentric frame of consciousness. Postcolonial theory thus operates with the paradoxical tension of relying on the secular, European vocabulary of its academic origins to translate non-secular, non-European experiences. Despite brilliant attempts to elucidate (or perhaps theorize away) this dilemma, the question of the non-western Other's agency remains suspended and unresolved, while the material conditions that generate a culture of dubious virtues (such as "hybridity" and "identity politics") acquire more theoretical legitimacy.

**They replicate the error of representing others**

**Thomas 94** – senior research fellow, Australian National University (Nicholas, Colonialism’s Culture, p 158-9)

Critics of colonial discourse often write, unavoidably, from within the terrain that they wish to interrogate: as critics of and in the Western literary and theoretical canon, or as historians trained in one Western historiographic tradition or another. The claim and aspiration to speak in some sense from a native or colonized perspective has been intensively debated. If one speaks on behalf of ‘others’, there is a risk of creating false identifications and assimilating ‘their’ perspectives to one’s own; if one makes one’s own interest explicit, and is content only to speak about ‘them’ and ‘their’ self-representations, one may be accused of recapitu­lating what is seen as the paradigmatic exclusion of Orientalist discourse, namely constituting the presence of an author and an authority on the basis of the other’s absence. I do not wish to pursue these questions here, because their politics cannot be adequately registered through global terms such as ‘others’ and ‘authors’. It makes a difference whether an author is a historian, a cultural theorist, a film critic or an ethnog­rapher. It makes a great deal of difference, in particular, whether this author has produced his or her representations on the basis of sustained involvement with the people involved, and whether they therefore have particular expectations arising from that encounter. It also makes a difference who ‘they’ are; Tolai, Inuit, Chicanos and Tamils are not discursively interchangeable ‘others’ but peoples with very different locations, different access to state resources and education and different concerns. In one case they may regard it as highly inappropriate for anyone other than a member of the immediate community to narrate or represent their histories and identities; in other cases they may welcome the assistance of someone who is an outsider or partial outsider such as a diaspora-trained scholar. In these debates it sometimes seems to be assumed that colonial studies is primarily about ‘others’ — about representing ‘them’ in some way that is more acceptable politically, epistemologically and ethically. A number of writers have now pointed out that this fetishization of alterity easily recapitulates an us/them disjunction which has in fact long been fissured and cut across by migration and transactions in both directions. There is also a risk that it neglects the extent to which colonial studies cannot take the identities of colonists as an unproblematic reference point.

**Double bind—playing up the violence of colonialism discursively replicates this violence**

**Goss** **96** – Aboriginal Resource and Research Centre, New South Wales (Jasper, Postcolonialism, Third World Quarterly 17:2)

Gates argues that postcolonial theory has created its own double bind whereby one can choose to: empower the native discursively... downplaying the epistemic (and literal) violence of colonialism; or play up the absolute nature of colonial domination, [by] negating the subjectivity and agency of the colonised, thus textually replicating the repressive operations of colonialism. 29 The theoretical implications are that one is left in a constantly ambiguous position as to the impact of colonialism. Even Young, an admirer of postcolonial projects, must still raise the question, `of what, if anything, is specific to the colonial situation if colonial texts only demonstrate the same properties that can be found in any deconstructive reading of European texts’ .30 If the subaltern cannot speak (according to Spivak) and never will, then the situation we are left with is one that half-heartedly acknowledges the social ramifications of colonialism but has no way (or seeks none) of locating them within an historical project outside of `local’ discourses. Ahmad notes the impact of this theoretical turn by arguing that, `[colonialism ] thus becomes a transhistorical thing, always present and always in the process of dissolution in one part of the world or another, so that everyone gets the privilege, sooner or later, at one time or another, of being coloniser, colonised and postcolonial’.31 We have arrived at a situation where the difference between the coloniser and colonised is not only the result of colonial discourses but in fact can be turned around so that the coloniser is in fact colonised as well. There is no dispute that it is certainly desirable to make a critique of static and universalist categories (black, white, Third World, etc), but by seeking an eternal regress postcolonial theory problematises every category to the point at which it has no usefulness whatsoever. As Dirlik states: postcolonialism’ s repudiation of structure and totality in the name of history ironically ends up not in an affirmation of historicity but in a self-referential, universalising historicism that reintroduces through the back door an unexamined totality; it projects globally what are but local experiences.

**Postcolonialism is inevitably co-opted to legitimize colonialism**

**Dirlik 99** – Prof Social Science, History and Anthropology, U Oregon (Arif, How the grinch hijacked radicalism, Postcolonial Studies 2:2)

In the light of what I have observed above with reference to the re-evaluation of class formations in earlier national liberation movements, it may be understandable why postcolonial critics from formerly colonial societies should be reluctant to speak to issues of class, as they hail for the most part from classes that were(and are) suspect in the eyes of nativists. This makes it all the more imperative to speak to issues of class, however, as postcolonial elites are increasingly entangled in the transnational class formations produced by global reconfigurations. In the process, the postcolonial argument is mobilised to serve as an alibi for a cultural colonialism that is so thorough that it is nearly impossible to speak about it, as colonialism itself loses its meaning where it proceeds by consent of the colonised. However diluted in its dissolution of social differences into generalities about marginality or subalternity, the postcolonial argument even in its later phase initially retained concern for the underdog; as witness the affinity postcolonial critics have expressed with the Subaltern historians. By now, however, postcolonial criticism has become absorbed into institutions of power, its arguments appropriated by those who may feel marginal in certain ways, but represent new forms of power in others.

**They legitimize atrocity**

**Williams 97** – visiting fellow, Afrika-Studiecentrum (Adebayo, The postcolonial flaneur and other fellow-travellers, Third World Quarterly 18:5, AG)

Postcolonialism, as it is marked by the concept of hybridity, is a symptom pretending to be a diagnosis. The intellectual charms of contingency and the renunciation of agency have not stopped the agents of history. Hybridity did not stop three wars between India and Pakistan, despite the fact that the latter was hacked out of the former on the eve of independence. Indeed, neither has hybridity prevented the homogenous clans of Somalia from permanently waging war among themselves nor did it prevent the grotesque barbarity visited uponUS soldiers in that unhappy land. Hybridity or even assimilation did not confuse a superpower like France as to the real object and objective of its forty three documented interventions in `postcolonial’ Africa, and neither did it dissuade the Nigerian military authorities from executing Kenule Saro-Wiwa, who was making legitimate demands for his distinct nationality within the realities of a multinational Nigeria.